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Clarifying Patent Terminology and Patent Concepts
An Introduction To Some Basic Concepts And Doctrine
CARL S. KOENIG*
THERE IS AN increasing need for the bench and bar to have more than a sur-
face understanding of patent law. Patents play a role in many industries
which is inseparable from other business practices and conditions. The law-
yer who advises business firms while ignorant of patent law does so at his cli-
ent's peril. Judges need an understanding which will enable them to extract
some guides to decision from the inconsistent and often vacuous traditional
patent doctrines.
To most lawyers who are not patent specialists, however, patent law ap-
pears to be a pathless jungle-a dark and mysterious forest of scientific tech-
nology, full of reptile-length sentences, roving terminology and fleetfooted
concepts, where many carniverous doctrines prowl by the dim light of day
and antitrust prowls by the dimmer light of night, perpetually darkened by
a semantic mist, and populated only by the heathen natives of the "patent
bar" tribe.
Few dare to enter.
These dangerous beasts cannot be controlled and some paths through the
forest cannot be cleared without light to see by. It is first necessary to dispel
the semantic mist.
The semantic problems arise from the confusing "definitions" given to
some key concepts, and the fact that other key terms have been used to refer
to a half dozen or more different key concepts. The mist created is not easily
penetrable by most lawyers who are not patent specialists. It is so irritating
to the eyes of even the natives that there are ever-running battles against
* B.S. (Economics), 1959, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; LL.B., 1963, Yale Law School;
LL.M., 1964, Yale Law School; member of the District of Columbia Bar. This article was
written prior to my accepting my present employment; the views are entirely my own and
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non-existent demons-false issues which have no substance below the verbal
level. Even high-ranking government commissions can miss affecting the real,
and tough, issues because they are striking out against the false ones.
There is no shortage of real, tough, controversial issues which need analy-
sis, and need understanding by not only patent lawyers but the bench and
bar generally. With the aim of preparing lawyers who are not patent special-
ists to grapple with or understand such issues, this paper discusses the con-
tent or lack of content in alternative "definitions" of key concepts, such as
those referred to by the terms "patent," "valid patent" and "essence of an
invention," and for several key terms, such as "invention" and "standard
of invention," it distinguishes the different concepts indiscriminately refer-
red to by a single term. There is also some discussion of patent doctrine in
addition to the doctrine presented in the analysis of terms and concepts, so
that the non-patent lawyer will be provided with a minimum introduction
to basic patent doctrine.
The paper will consider:
I. "Patents," "Valid Patents" and the "Presumption of Validity"
Definitions of a "patent"
"Valid" and "invalid" patents
"Apparently valid" patents, patents of
"uncertain validity" and "apparently
invalid" patents
Partial and total validity
Importance of these distinctions-the
"license to sue" controversy
Relevant antitrust considerations
The "presumption of validity"
II. What is "the invention"?
The nature of "claims"
Four types of uses of the term "invention"
Colloquial uses of "invention" vis-a-vis "claims"
"Invention" as a term of art
Clarity, confusion and the "invention"
The protection given to the "set of
claimed inventions" in a "valid patent"
III. The two meanings of the term "Standard of Invention"
The historical background
The two meanings of "standard of invention"
The current status of the "standard of invention"
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I
"PATENTS," "VALID PATENTS," AND THE "PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY"
Definitions of a "patent"
In defining a "patent," it is important to keep entirely separate and distinct
(1) the definition and (2) the legal and factual consequences of owning a
patent. If this maxim is not followed, and some consequences are built into
the definition, utter confusion results in the discussion of the rights, privi-
leges, no-rights, duties, etc., of a patent owner.
An example of a definition with improperly built-in consequences is the
following: "A patent is a monopoly grant given to inventors by the govern-
ment to reward them for making and disclosing their inventions." This def-
inition builds in the legal consequence that the rights possessed by the owner
of a patent give him a monopoly of something, which is not correct under
present law. It also builds in the legal consequence that the rights possessed
by the owner of a patent are created upon the issuance of the patent, which
also is not correct. Further, it builds in a proposition to the effect that the
patent system is based on a reward theory, or results in a reward to the inven-
tor; this is questionable as a proposition of historical fact, dubious as a state-
ment of what courts recognize as the goal of patent statutes, and uncertain
as a prediction of the future income of inventors. All of these matters are
appropriate ones for discussion, but building one view of them into the def-
inition of a patent would forclose discussion.
To avoid building in legal or factual consequences, a patent can most use-
fully be defined as: that printed document which is issued by the Commis-
sioner of Patents when "it appears that the applicant is entitled to a patent
under the law."' The focus of this definition is on the officially certified
"piece of paper," a factual event, and not on future consequences which re-
sult from its issuance.
Correspondingly, the "issuance" of a patent is defined as: the authorita-
tive act of the Commissioner of Patents of putting forth this document. The
document is evidence that this authoritative act, as well as others, has in fact
occurred. Again the focus is on a factual event, the previous occurrence of a
human act, and not on consequences. The fact of the issuance of a patent
may or may not have the factual consequence of giving the patentee a re-
ward, or the legal consequences of giving the patentee certain rights; this is
left open by the definitions.
"Valid" and "invalid" patents
"Validity" is not a property like size, weight or color. It is not the type of
property which can be ascribed to a piece of paper. The printed document
'35 U.S.C. § 131 (1952).
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we call a patent cannot possess a property of validity. To ask whether a pat-
ent "is" valid or invalid is to misfocus the inquiry onto present and past
events, and to wrongly indicate that sufficient study will lead to a certain
answer. This question misses the basic point that validity refers to a predic-
tion of the future behavior of human beings. Concern with the validity of a
patent is a concern for whether all necessary conditions for the issuance of a
patent will be found by courts to have been satisfied.
Patents can be held valid by the Supreme Court, one or more Courts of
Appeal, District Courts or state courts, or be unadjudicated. When a patent
has been held valid by a District Court, one can predict the outcome of fu-
ture contests concerning its validity with greater certainty than when the
patent was unadjudicated. A patent held valid by the Supreme Court will
almost certainly be held valid in future contests, but even in this case new
evidence could conceivably arise.2 For all patents, therefore, statements re-
garding validity refer to predictions, of varying probability, of future court
behavior.
The best way to maintain the proper focus and avoid an illusion of cer-
tainty would be to not use the term "valid patent" at all, and instead talk
specifically about such things as past court decisions and the probability of
various outcomes in future decisions by various courts.
If the term must be used, it should be restricted to the use given by the def-
inition: A valid patent is a patent which to almost any informed observer
appears to be one which almost certainly will not be held unenforceable be-
cause the conditions for the issuance of a patent were not met.8 The focus here
is primarily on probabilities concerning court decisions, with only secondary
emphasis being given to events which occurred prior to the issuance of the
patent. The definition requires high concurrence among both observers and
courts, and includes both events in the patent examination process and events
pertaining to the development of the product or process.
Correspondingly, an invalid patent is defined as a patent which to almost
any informed observer appears to be one which almost certainly will be held
unenforceable because the conditions for the issuance of a patent were not
met.
Certainly prior to a court adjudication or validity it cannot be said with
2 ... One patent twice held valid [by the Supreme Court] in 1935 was denied validity by
the same Justices in 1937. In Bassick Mfg. Co. v. R. M. Hollingworth Co., 298 U.S. 415
[29 USPQ 311] (1936), the patentee had won 299 victories in the lower courts, but the
Supreme Court held the patent invalid except as to narrow claims which were not
infringed....
Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 639 n.2, 53 USPQ 563, 569 n.2 (concurring
opinion of Judge Frank).
3 A patent is not defined as a valid patent when all relevant conditions for issuance are
met, or are likely to be held to have been met, since the violation of some conditions may
not be fatal.
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sufficient confidence that a court will not hold the patent unenforceable, be-
cause the conditions for the issuance of a patent were not met, so as to justify
using the term "valid patent."
"Apparently valid" patents, patents of "uncertain validity" and "apparently
invalid" patents
Patents which are not clearly valid or invalid, as defined above, will be clas-
sified by patentees, potential infringers and observers as "apparently valid"
patents, patents of "uncertain validity," or "apparently invalid" patents.
This classification turns upon their estimate of the probability that the court
which gets its hands on the patent will not find it unenforceable because the
conditions for the issuance of a patent were not met. This classification of a
patent will vary among classifiers, and will be a function of their knowledge
of surrounding circumstances (e.g., prior inventors, prior references), their
knowledge of Patent Office practices and legal doctrine, and their estimation
of the other factors which influence court decisions (e.g., which circuit the
trial would be held in, which side could obtain the sympathy of the trial
court).
Partial and total validity
All patents contain a set of "claims." As will be described later, each patent
claim describes something which the patentee seeks to protect. A court may
hold some valid while holding others invalid, and some may go unlitigated
in a specific court contest.
One litigation of a patent's validity does not necessarily settle the matter
with respect to the patent claims specifically held valid or invalid.4 It certain-
ly does not settle, though it affects, the outcome of a future court decision
on the validity of the unlitigated patent claims. A patent may well be con-
sidered a partially valid patent, a partially invalid patent and partially an
apparently valid patent, for example, at the same time.
Depending on whether some or all of the patent claims qualify for the par-
ticular term's application, the qualification "partially" or "totally" must be
added to the terms valid patent, apparently valid patent, patent of uncertain
validity, apparently invalid patent and invalid patent.
' As to the effects of an adjudication on the same defendant, on customers of a successful
defendant-manufacturer, on other defendants sued in the same circuit, and on other defend-
ants sued in different circuits, see AMDUR, PATENT LAW AND PRACTIcE, c. XXVI (on a motion
for preliminary injunction) (1935); 3 WALKER, PATENTS §§ 683-85, 773, 787 (Deller's ed.
1937); 3 WALKER, PATENTS §§ 684, 773 (Supp. 1964); HOAR, PATENT TAcTIcs AND LAW § 14-36
(3d ed. 1950).
Catholic University Law Review
Importance of these distinctions-The "license to sue" controversy
The distinctions between a patent, valid patent, apparently valid patent,
patent of uncertain validity, apparently invalid patent and invalid patent,
and whether the validity is partial or total, are important. Consider the dis-
pute as to whether the issuance of a patent is a grant to its owner of the "right"
to exclude others from making, using or selling the "patented invention," or
whether it is merely a "license to sue" and establish this right.
As to whether the issuance of the patent constitutes the grant of this right,
compare the language of 35 U.S.C. §154 (1952): "Every patent shall con-
tain.., a grant... of the right to exclude others from making, using or sell-
ing the invention. ... [Emphasis added.] This section of the Patent Act
does not say that the issuance of a patent constitutes a grant of the right. It
merely prescribes a series of English words which are to appear on that print-
ed document which is a patent. Whether the rights which these words pur-
port to create are actually created is a question not dealt with by this section
of the statute. That this is so is shown by the effect given to the precursor of
this section,5 which had read: "Every patent shall contain.., a grant... of
the right to make, use and vend the invention"; all patents had dutifully con-
tained a series of words purporting to grant the right to make, use and vend;
however the courts consistently held that the issuance of a patent did not
constitute a grant of the right to make, use and vend, but rather, that when
a patent was held valid the patentee had the quite different right to exclude
others from making, using and vending the invention.
Only the owner of a valid patent can be secure that he can obtain the aid
of a court (has a "right") to so exclude others. The owner of a patent which
potential defendants consider an apparently valid patent will be able to so
exclude others (or obtain substantial license fees) to a large degree, with-
out actually securing the aid of a court, by utilizing the threat of suit. The
owner of a patent which potential defendants consider a patent of uncertain
validity can do the same to a lesser degree. The owner of a patent which po-
tential defendants consider an apparently invalid patent will usually (but
not always) be unable to so exclude others (or obtain substantial license
fees) by utilizing the threat of suit, and will not, if he himself considers the
patent to be an apparently invalid patent, actually bring a suit to trial; but
he nevertheless may be able to obtain revenue from the "nuisance value" of
his patent." The owner of an invalid patent will find himself unable to se-
cure a court's aid, or employ the threat of suit, to so exclude others.
'The former Rv. STAT. § 4884 (1875), 35 (Old) U.S.C. § 40 (1946) [reprinted at 35 U.S.C.A.
appendix II].
0 "Even the legal profession contains a small group of what may be called 'patent chasers,'
who use the threat of court challenge to exact out-of-court settlements when such settlements
[Vol. XV
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Since the issuance of the patent is not conclusive of the right to so exclude
others, all that the issuance of a patent, per se, grants is a "license to sue" in a
federal court 7 to have determined whether or not the patentee has a right
to so exclude others.8
Relevant Antitrust Considerations
It was stated above that the owner of a patent which potential defendants
consider an apparently valid patent will be able to exclude others or obtain
substantial license fees, to a large degree, without actually securing the aid
of a court, by utilizing the threat of suit. It must not be forgotten, however,
that the classification of a patent as an apparently valid patent, patent of un-
certain validity or apparently invalid patent will vary among potential de-
fendants. Some potential defendants may consider a patent an apparently
valid patent while others consider it an apparently invalid patent. Consider
the following situation:9
... The author knows of one actual case where a patent, very vital to an entire
industry, is held by the X Company. All of its competitors, except the Y Com-
pany, pay a substantial royalty for this device on every machine they build. The
reason that Y Company pays no tribute is that it has found and bought and con-
cealed a machine embodying the patented feature, and made more than two
years before the filing of the patent application. X exacts no royalty from Y, and
in return Y keeps the existence of this machine secret; for its production in any
court would at once result in X's patent being declared absolutely void.
Query: Is the agreement between X and Y, to actively suppress evidence
which would cause a court to hold the patent invalid, a contract which un-
reasonably restrains trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act?
might be less than the cost of an ordinary defense." KURSH, INSIDE THE PATENT OFFICE 17
(1959).
7 The proper court is sometimes the U.S. District Court [28 U.S.C. §1338 (1948)] and some-
times the Court of Claims [as amended: 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1949)]. The venue provision is
28 U.S.C. § 1400 (1948). Service of process provisions are 28 U.S.C. § 1694 (1948) and 35 U.S.C.
§ 293 (1952). Court costs provisions are 28 U.S.C. § 1928 (1948) and 35 U.S.C. §§ 284, 288
(1952).
8 "In the case of ordinary doubt, the policy of the patent system, as customarily maintained
in the Patent Office, has been to give the applicant the benefit thereof, because no absolute
right of property is conferred by the grant of the patent .... The patentee is merely put in
a position to assert his prima facia right against infringers who may in their defense raise
the question of the validity of the patent, and have the same ... adjudicated in the light of
a full presentation and consideration of all the evidence attainable .... (Emphasis added.)
In re Thompson, 26 App. D.C. 419, 425 (1906), quoted in U.S. PATENT OFFICE (GEORGE
ROEMING), COURT DECISIONS As GUIDES TO PATENT OFFICE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE, [Study
No. 25 of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on
the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (86 Cong., 2nd Sess.)] 2-3 (1960).
0 HOAR, supra note 4, at § 19-28.
1965]
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Even without agreement, there are antitrust problems. Potential defend-
ants may consider a patent apparently valid while the patentee has reason
to consider the patent susceptible of being proved invalid. Consider the fol-
lowing view of the situation described above: 10
... note that X's patent is not void-yet! And until it is declared void by some
competent court, there is nothing illegal, or even immoral, in X continuing to
collect royalties. No less an honest gentleman than the late Chief Justice Taft
(ex-president of the United States), has expressed his opinion that it is not in
the least unethical to conceal from an infringer the evidence which would un-
questionably invalidate one's own patent. Mr. Taft aptly said: "We do not un-
derstand it to be contended that there was any relation between the Computing
Scale Company and the Toledo Company which made it the duty of the former
to furnish evidence to the latter to weaken its own case." 70 [fn. 70: Toledo v.
Computing, 1924 C.D. 486. Cf. Raymond v. Wikersham, 54 (U.S.) P.Q. 244. In
so far as the Toledo Case involved active suppression of evidence, as distin-
guished from mere keeping quiet about it, it is undoubtedly overruled by Key-
stone v. General, 19 (U.S.) P.Q. 228.]
In Toledo v. Computing," the Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Taft, held
that active suppression of evidence of patent invalidity [not letting other
infringement suits go to trial when the defense obtained anticipatory scales
built by another, and buying up and concealing all of the other available
anticipatory scales], where some remaining scraps of evidence were not sup-
pressed [possible witnesses were not kidnapped],--and said in dicta that si-
lence about the existence of evidence of invalidity--did not constitute fraud
which "actually prevented" the defendant-infringer from establishing inva-
lidity and which would allow him to collaterally attack the judgment of in-
fringement in an antitrust suit." Raymond v. Wickersham12 also concerned a
situation where judgment had already been rendered and the issue argued
was the nature and consequences of the "fraud" practiced on the court. But
in Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator,"3 where the issue of active sup-
pression of evidence [obtaining a false affidavit from, and suppressing evi-
dence of prior use by, another] was timely raised in the trial court, the Su-
preme Court held that active suppression of invalidity-and said in dicta that
silence about the existence of evidence 4 -- constituted an "unclean hands" de-
fense which could be raised by a defendant-infringer. And in Precision In-
1o Ibid.
11261 U.S. 393 (1923).
129 F. 2d 522, 54 USPQ 244 (CCPA, 1942).
290 U.S. 240, 19 USPQ 228 (1933).
a... nothing about the case should be guarded, but everything that tends to a full and
fair determination of the matters in controversy should be placed before the court ....
Id. at 244, 19 USPQ at 230.
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strument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co.,1 5 the Supreme
Court, after discussing the reasons which "give the public a paramount in-
terest in seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from
fraud or other inequitable conduct" and measuring the facts "by both pub-
lic and private standards of equity,"' 6 held that silence as to evidence of in-
validity [in this case perjury] constituted an "unclean hands" defense, which
could be raised by a defendant-infringer-licensee even if he had participated
in the conduct which violated public standards of equity and the license con-
tract forbade challenging validity. The Court referred to an "uncompromis-
ing duty to report" to the Patent Office "all facts concerning fraud or inequi-
tableness."'
7
Query: Does the unilateral active suppression of evidence of invalidity by
a corporate assignee of a patent constitute (1) a conspiracy which unreason-
ably restrains trade and is therefore illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, under that act's "intracorporate conspiracy" doctrine, or (2) an attempt
to monopolize which is illegal under Section 2 of the Sherman Act? In con-
cert with other questionable activities, much less than active suppression has
been held illegal. In U.S. v. Krasnow,'8 merely actively avoiding adjudication
of validity [threatening or bringing harrassing suits against competitors and
their retailers, with the settling of such suits when an aggressive defense was
presented], in concert with other activities, caused a finding of a conspiracy
to restrain trade and monopolize in violation of both Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. In U.S. v. Singer Mfg. Co.,19 agreeing with others to be silent
about prior art [settling interference suits and making agreements to be si-
lent about prior art, so that patents of questionable novelty and priority is-
sued], in concert with other activities, was held to be a conspiracy violation
of Section 1 (and Section 2 ?) of the Sherman Act (the attempt to monopo-
lize charge being dropped on appeal). Does it matter whether the active sup-
pression occurs before or after the patent issues?20 The Supreme Court will
soon rule on private litigants' standing to sue for treble damages when such
Sherman Act violations occur.21
324 U.S. 806, 65 USPQ 133 (1945).
I' d. at 816, 65 USPQ at 138.
"Id. at 818, 65 USPQ at 139.
'8143 F. Supp. 184, 110 USPQ 411 (E.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd per curiam 355 U.S. 5, 115 USPQ
70 (1957).
"9 374 U.S. 174, 137 USPQ 808 (1963), reversing Chief Judge Ryan's decision reported at
205 F. Supp. 394, 133 USPQ 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
210 Where the suppression takes place before the patent issues, the question becomes whether
the fraud on the Patent Office constitutes an antitrust violation. The FTC said yes in the
Tetracycline Case [In the Matter of American Cyanamid Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16527
(FTC, Aug. 8, 1963) and 16699 (FTC, Dec. 17, 1963), appeal docketed, Nos. 15788, 15799,
15801, 15805-06, 6th Cir., Mar. 2, 1964.] The same issue is raised by the case cited note
21 infra.
2' The Seventh Circuit had held that a private litigant could not base a treble damage
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Query: If a patentee knows of, but keeps quiet about, such evidence (with-
out necessarily actively suppressing it) before signing a license agreement, is
there a failure of consideration (since the promise to forbear asserting a claim
of patent infringement is made by "one who has not an honest and reason-
able belief in its validity"22) ? If so: since the failure of consideration takes
place at the time of signing the license agreement rather than at the time of
the adjudication of invalidity [the usual time consideration for a license
agreement fails, 23 which is why a licensee usually cannot recover for royalties
paid before the adjudication of invalidity24], can a licensee recover all royal-
ties previously paid? He can when a suit by the government causes a patent
to be adjudicated invalid for fraud on the Patent Office25 and when the en-
forcement of a patent constitutes an antitrust violation.26 Is the right to re-
cover royalty payments a question of state law or federal law?2 7
It was said above that the owner of a patent which potential defendants
consider an apparently invalid patent will usually be unable to exclude oth-
ers, or obtain substantial license fees, by utilizing the threat of suit. But this
is not always so. It may be possible for a large corporation with a question-
able patent, by the threat of a suit (without bringing it to trial), to exclude
(or obtain substantial license fees from) a smaller rival who cannot afford
costly patent litigation. 28 The difference in the size of the firm is crucial be-
cause there is no additional cost to a large corporation with a law firm on re-
tainer in bringing an extra suit, or in defending an extra suit; the smaller
antitrust suit on fraud on the Patent Office. Walker Process Equip. Co. v. Food Machinery &
Chemical Co., 335 F.2d 315, 142 USPQ 192 (7th Cir. 1964), petition for cert. filed 33 U.S. L.
WEEK 3154 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1964) (No. 602), the United States as amicus curiae in support of
the petition [379 U.S. 957 (1965)], cert. granted 379 U.S. 957 (1965).
RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS §§ 76, 78 (1933).
HOAR, supra note 4, at 285 n.54.
,Id. at 286, text at n. 65.
'Id. at 286 n.66 and accompanying text.
In the companion case to Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238,
61 USPQ 241 (1944), the Supreme Court said in Shawkee Mfg. Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.,
322 U.S. 271, 274, 61 USPQ 256, 257 (1944) that: "Whether this type of relief [recovery of
costs, payments and damages] will be granted must depend upon further proceedings in the
District Court." The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hartford-Empire Co. v. Shawkee
Mfg. Co., 163 F.2d 474, 74 USPQ 252 (3d Cir. 1947), allowed recovery of payments in settle-
ment, royalty payments and legal expenses, and authorized the District Court to grant puni-
tive damages. The punitive damage claim was settled by the payment of a lump sum of
almost a third of a million dollars. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 211 F.2d 928, 929
(text at n.1), 930 n.5 (3d Cir. 1954).
"See Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 55 USPQ 379 (1942).
Note, Recent Developments in the Law of Patents Under Thurman Arnold, 45 COL. L.
REV. 422, 431 n.42 (1945). See generally Ladd [formerly Commissioner of Patents, U.S. Patent
Office], Business Aggression Under The Patent System, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 353 (1959). Such
activity, if bad faith can actually be shown, may result in a finding of an antitrust violation.
Id. at 371, citing Kobe Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 196 F.2d 416, 94 USPQ 43 (10th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952).
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firm which must hire additional legal help for the occasion must bear the
cost itself. Thus:
[T]he disparity between what the patent office grants and what the courts will
enforce puts great weight on the relative ability of disputants in patent matters
to bear large costs and delays of litigation. A patent is a license to sue: where
the outcome is uncertain and the trial costly, the large patentee can in practice
enforce claims against weaker rivals which courts would be unlikely to sup-
port.29
Examples of attempts to do this are described in U.S. v. Krasnov ("The fi-
nancial strength of. . . [a potential manufacturer-defendant] was carefully
checked and when it was found out that it was weak and, in fact, almost out
of business, it was decided [by the patent owners, including a large corpora-
tion] to institute suit against that company.3 0) and Marconi Wireless Tele-
graph Co. v. Kilbourne & Clark Mfg. Co.31 (plaintiff corporation brought in-
fringement suits in several districts simultaneously in order to place unbear-
able litigation costs on one year old defendant corporation), and by Vaughn.
a2
In such situations the patentee will avoid a court trial. E.g., U.S. v. Krasnov
relates that the patent owners:
(1) brought ten suits against retailers without allowing the validity of the
patent to be adjudicated in any of them; either the retailer agreed to discon-
tinue purchasing competing lines, or, if the retail defendant showed any ag-
gressiveness in the defense, the suit was dismissed or discontinued for lack of
prosecution;
3 3
(2) brought four suits against manufacturers, none of which was adjudi-
cated on the merits;3 4 and
(3) used the threat of future suit to cause other retailers to stop handling
competing lines;8 5
no court had ever adjudicated the validity of the patent.
The "Presumption of Validity"
A valid patent has been defined as one which to almost any informed observ-
er appears to be one which almost certainly will not be held unenforceable
because the conditions for the issuance of a patent were not met. There is
certainly no justification for using this term prior to a court adjudication.
KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 163 (1959). Mr. Kaysen is an economist at Harvard
University. Mr. Turner, formerly at the Harvard Law School, has recently been appointed
Asst. Attorney General in charge of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division.
30 143 F. Supp. at 195, 110 USPQ at 417.
81235 Fed. 719 (W.D.Wash. 1916).
a VAUGHN, THE UNrrEo STATES PATENT SYSTEM 209-10 (1956).
'* 143 F. Supp. at 194, 195, 110 USPQ at 416, 418.
"Id. at 194-95, 110 USPQ at 416-17.
'Id. at 193-94, 110 USPQ at 416.
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A patent will be classified as an apparently valid patent if it is estimated
that the court which gets its hands on it will probably not find it unenforce-
able because the conditions for the issuance of a patent have not been met.
The term "presumption of validity" does not refer to an estimator's rule of
thumb which would assert that in fact most patents are apparently valid pat-
ents. It has no reference at all to the estimated outcome of court decisions.
The assertion that a patent has a presumption of validity (or is presumed
to be a valid patent) is an assertion that the court which is about to determine
validity should presume it from the mere fact that the patent was issued. By
presuming validity the trial court is helping the patentee, who like all plain-
tiffs has the burden of proof, by placing a burden of some kind on the party
challenging the patent.
It is an open issue whether the burden, placed on one opposing a patent
in court by the presumption of validity, is a "burden of proof," a "burden
of going forward" with some evidence, or something in-between. Consider
the views of Mr. Thomas Cooch:3 6
A "presumption" is an aid to the party having the burden of proof upon an
issue and operates to relieve him of the duty of presenting evidence until his
adversary has introduced proof to rebut the presumption.
I want to throw out a word of caution here: don't rely too heavily on Section
282 of the Patent Act of 1952-it probably doesn't mean what the patent bar in-
tended it to mean, but there has been no decision on this as yet.17 [fn. 17. The
question was dodged in General Motors v. Estate Stove Co., 203 F.2d 912, 97
U.S.P.Q. 88 (6th Cir. 1953) on the basis that the Patent Act of 1952 did not ap-
ply.] Section 282 provides in its first paragraph:
"A patent shall be presumed valid. The burden of establishing invalidity of
a patent shall rest on a party asserting it."
First of all, remember that a presumption is not evidence and disappears as
soon as direct or positive evidence is introduced.
But you ask, what about the second sentence dealing with the burden of es-
tablishing invalidity? Doesn't that make a difference?
Possibly it does, but more likely it doesn't. In my opinion it merely says the
same thing another way-that the party attacking the validity of a patent must
introduce the first evidence on that issue. Thus, it merely confirms the common
law rule that because of the presumption of validity the defendant has the ini-
tial burden of going forward with the evidence, and when he has gone forward
with the evidence the patentee must meet his normal burden of proof.
If you thought that Section 282 shifts the burden of proof of invalidity to the
3 Cooch, The Standard of Invention in the Courts, DYNAMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM:
DISCUSSION OF TEN CRITICAL AREAS OF CONTEMPORARY PATENT LAw (transcript of delivered
papers and floor discussion from ten patent law seminars held at the Villanova University
School of Law, 1957) [hereinafter cited as DYNAMICS] 39-40 (Ball ed. 1960). Mr. Cooch is a
permanent member of the Judicial Conference, U.S. Third Circuit. (Emphasis added.).
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defendant I suggest you take another look at the exact words used: "burden of
proof" is not even mentioned.
But, you say, doesn't "establish" mean the same as "prove"? Possibly so, but
probably not, for if Congress had so intended it would have used the word
"prove," which is a word of art.
Relevant also is the following commentary:
3 7
I have been unable to find anything in the cases to indicate that the law with
respect to the weight or strength and effect of presumptions has been changed
by the 1952 Act. The same language is found in the recent cases as in those be-
fore the Act, and the treatment is not perceptibly different. However, courts are
not uniform in the effect they give to presumptions generally, and this non-uni-
formity of treatment exists with respect to the presumption of validity in patent
cases. So it may be of some use to look at the principal possible procedural ef-
fects of presumption. There are three main ways of treating them. Support can
be found for each of these ways in patent cases.
The first one-the one that Mr. Cooch said is the common law rule-operates
in this way: as soon as some evidence is introduced tending to show invalidity,
the presumption disappears. Under this rule the patent would be held invalid
unless some countervailing evidence is introduced. In other words, the presump-
tion merely determines who has the initial burden of producing evidence, not
how much or what quality the evidence must have.
The second manner in which presumptions have been treated is to give them
a certain additional stature-to make them a kind of hurdle-which requires
that substantial evidence of invalidity be presented before the burden shifts to
the one asserting the patent. In other words, the evidence of invalidity must be
such as to create at least a reasonable doubt about validity.
The third type of procedural effect sometimes given presumptions is to re-
quire that what is referred to as "clear and convincing proof of invalidity" be
introduced in order to overcome the presumption. This is the view expressed by
Justice Cardozo in the 1934 RCA Case and it's been repeated in many decisions
since the 1952 Act.
The conclusion I would like to suggest be drawn is that you cannot tell, with
any reasonable degree of certainty, which if any of these procedural effects a
court will give to Section 282.
The justification for placing some burden on one opposing a patent is that
some weight should be given to the Patent Office's adjudication on the issue
of validity. The heaviness of the burden should therefore depend upon how
good a job is done by the Patent Office when it adjudicates validity.
While there are many court statements saying that the presumption of va-
lidity can be overcome only with clear and satisfactory proof, 8  the courts have
37 Beck, Remarks during Floor Discussion of Mr. Cooch's paper, DYNAMICS 65-66.
1 Cases making such an assertion are collected in 2 WALKER, PATENTS §276 (Deller's ed.
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usually been merely assuming this and stating it in passing rather than fac-
ing and deciding the issue.8 9 But this assumption, which implies that the bur-
den is a burden of proof, has long been recognized as inconsistent with the
Patent Office policy of sub silentio resolving doubts as to the validity of claims
in favor of the applicant.40 This Patent Office policy, known as the "rule of
doubt," consists of: (1) placing the burden of proof (the risk of non-persua-
sion) on the issue of validity on the Examiner, so that he must prove that the
claims should be rejected rather than the applicant proving that the claims
should be allowed, 41 (2) making the Examiner prove "beyond a reasonable
doubt" that the claims should be rejected, by having him resolve all "reason-
able doubts" in favor of the applicant, 42 and (3) prohibiting the Examiner
from indicating when he is allowing claims only because he has a reasonable
doubt (so that courts will not be able to tell which are the patents whose
claims the Examiner doubted were valid)43. The justification for the Patent
Office's policy is that an applicant should be allowed a day in court, and by
the issuance of a patent the patentee "is merely put in a position to assert
his prima facia right against infringers." 44 If the burden created by the pre-
sumption of validity was a burden of proof, then one could attain patent
rights without ever having to establish that one is entitled thereto-the mere
assertion of being entitled to a patent, made by the filing of an application,
would place on the world the burden of proving that the asserted claims are
unpatentable. That this is not the Supreme Court's view of how the mere
filing of a patent application should affect the nation's economy can be seen
from Great A&P Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Co.,45 and the Patent Office's
1937), 3 id. at §701, and RIVISE & CAESAR, PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY §6 (1936). The many
ways of saying the same thing are collected in 2 WALKER, PATENTS §276 (SunP. 1964) and 3
id. at §701.
"The same unquestioning assumption is made in U.S. PATENT OFFICE (GEORGE ROEMING),
supra note 8, at 5-7 (text).
,0 GLASCOCK & STRINGHAM, PATENT SOLICITING AND EXAMINING §88 (1934); STRINCHAM, OUT-
LINE OF PATENT LAW §6510 (1937). See the arguments in §8580, id.
"l U.S. PATENT OFFICE (GEORGE ROEMING), supra note 8, at 3, 4, and n.8.
'5 Ibid; STRINGHAM, supra note 40, at § 6510; MCCRADY, PATENT OFFICE PRACTICE § 118 (4th
ed. 1959).
"1 This is the rule of the Commissioner of Patent's decision in Ex parte Overstrom, 1903
C.D. 263 (1903) and U.S. PATENT OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (all
editions) §707.07 (d); see also MCCRADY, supra note 42, §119, and STRINGHAM, Supra note 40,
§8580.
In contrast, the federal courts, the C.C.P.A., and the Patent Office Board of Appeals can
indicate when it is allowing a claim because it has not been shown beyond a reasonable doubt
that the claim is invalid. [The assertion in HOAR, supra note 4 at § 8-28, that the Board of
Appeals may not so indicate, seems to be erroneous-see GLASCOCK & STRINGHAM, supra note
40, §88 (citing cases) and the 2nd edition of MCCRADY, PATENT OFFICE PRACTICE §130 (citing
cases) (2nd ed. 1946).]
"In re Thompson, supra note 8, (emphasis added).
5 340 U.S. 147, 87 U.S.P.Q. 303 (1950).
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analysis of this case. 46 The A&P Case implies that the "burden of establish-
ing invalidity" which an opponent of a patent must bear is not a burden of
proof,47 but only a burden of going foward with evidence. Since the Examin-
er cannot disclose when he is using the rule of doubt (this prohibition being
enforceable by the applicant if the Examiner should attempt to), all pat-
ents are on an equal footing. In Berghane v. R.C.A., 48 decided and affirmed
after the 1952 Patent Act, Chief Judge Leahy denied that there was a pre-
sumption of validity (in the sense of a burden of proof) in favor of a pat-
ent during a time when the Patent Office was following its rule of doubt, for
during such times the Patent Office was not exercising its judgment as to va-
lidity but was passing that question on to the courts. The Patent Office is still
following its rule of doubt, and not exercising its judgment on validity.
As indicated above, since the justification for placing any burden on one
opposing a patent is to give some weight to the Patent Office's exercise of
judgment on validity, the weight of the burden should depend upon how
good a job is done by the Patent Office when it adjudicates validity. The Pat-
ent Office's rule of doubt alone could be considered enough reason for the
burden not being a burden of proof, Full analysis of what the burden should
be, however, would require analysis not only of the rule of doubt, but also
analysis of the limited ability of the Examiner to gather the evidence upon
which to adjudicate (e.g., his limited ability to make a "validity search" for
prior references), the institutional pressures within the Patent Office (such
as production quotas) which tend to prevent proper adjudication by the Ex-
aminers, and the effect of decisions by the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals49 which force Examiners to allow patents under rules of law, and a
"standard of invention," which is unacceptable to the Federal Courts.50
II
WHAT IS "THE INVENTION"?
The Nature of "Claims"
Every patent contains a copy of the "specification and drawings," 5' 1 which
are the "specification" and "drawings" which were included in the patent
'U.S. PATENT OFFICE (GEORGE ROEMING), Court Decisions as Guides to Patent Office Policy
and Performance, supra note 8, 8-11, 14 (text at note 39).
," See id. at 6 and n.12.
"4116 F. Supp. 200, 99 USPQ 264 (D.Del. 1953), aff'd 217 F.2d 490, 103 USPQ 406 (3d
Cir. 1954).
" The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals is the court to which patent applicants may
appeal if dissatisfied with a decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals. 35 U.S.C. §141
(1952). An applicant can, in the alternative, bring a civil action against the Commissioner
of Patents in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. 35 U.S.C. §145 (1952).
5"This latter may come to an end if the Supreme Court holds that it has jurisdiction in
Brenner v. Manson, No. 932, U.S. Supreme Court, granting cert., 380 U.S. 971 (1965), review-
ing, 333 F.2d 234, 142 USPQ 35 (1964).
35 U.S.C. §154 (1952).
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application 2 as amended during prosecution before the Patent Office. The
"specification" in an application consists of two parts, one of which is
also called a "specification,"5 the other of which is called the "claims." The
"specification" (in the narrower sense) includes a description of at least one
"specific embodiment" of "the invention," 54 and is followed by one or more
"claims," which "claim" in varying degrees of breadth "the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention." 55 "Ordinarily, the application
will contain several claims, some of them 'broad,' that is, covering many de-
vices besides the specific device disclosed, and some of them 'narrow,' that
is, so limited that any reference upon which they 'read' will be practically the
same as the [specific] disclosed device." 56 Broad claims stand somewhere
between the applicant's specific embodiment and his "idea" (or "principle"),
reaching toward the latter. Claims vary in breadth depending on (1) the
variation in the number of features recited by the claim, and (2) the varia-
tion in the specificity of the description of any feature recited by the claim.5
7
Some claims in a patent may be infringed while narrower ones are not;
some may be valid while broader ones are not. Hence in an infringement
suit some claims of a patent may be held "valid and infringed," others "valid
but not infringed" (or not infringed, with no holding on validity), and oth-
ers "invalid" (with or without a holding on infringement).
Four types of uses of the term "invention"
The word "invention" has been used in different senses as a verb, an abstract
and semi-abstract noun, and a concrete noun.
"Invention" has been used as a verb to refer to the act of inventing, as when
one's thinking up a device is referred to as "invention."
"Invention" has also been used as an abstract noun to refer to a supposed
inventive quality which a device or process is considered capable of possess-
ing, as when it is asked of a device whether "invention is present" or whether
it "lacks invention." It is similarly used as a semi-abstract noun to refer to a
535 U.S.C. §111 (1952).
1Sections 111, 112 para. 1, 112 paras. 2 and 154 of the 1952 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293
(1952), use the term "specification" to include both the "specification" (in the narrower sense)
and the "claims." It is not clear whether the same is true for para. 3 of Section 112, which
may be using the term specification in the narrower sense.
51 "The specification shall contain a written description of the invention ... and shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention." 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 para. 1 (1952).
1 "The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 35
U.S.C. § 112 para. 2 (1952).
"' U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, PATENT OFFICE, TRAINING MANUAL FOR PATENT EX-
AMINERS: PART I: INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW AND EXAMINING PRACTICE 12 (1955 ed.).
(Quotes added.)
57 Cf. STRINGHAM, PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING §5033 (2d ed. 1952).
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class of devices and processes which possess a common inventive quality, as
when it is asked of a specific device whether "it is an invention." This sort of
use is only meaningful if it is clearly kept in mind that the common "quality"
is not inherent in the devices and processes, and specific criteria which will
define the common "quality" must be chosen and articulated. Different cri-
teria have been chosen by different people for different purposes, often while
they were asserting that they had found the "true" criteria, causing a great
deal of confusion and difficulty. This used to be especially troublesome be-
cause for many years the conditions for the issuance of a patent included the
judicially determined criteria which defined "inventions." The 1952 Patent
Act58 adopted such criteria as conditions for the issuance of a patent without
using the word "invention" in this sense, thus making the choice of criteria
for defining "invention" irrelevant for most purposes. However the Patent
Act is modified by, and interpreted in the light of, the Constitution, 59 which
uses the word "discoveries" (i.e.: "inventions"); 60 also, it can be argued that
the conditions for the issuance of a patent set out in Patent Act are not ex-
lusive of other conditions developed through judicial decisions; thus the
choice of criteria for defining "invention" in this sense is not entirely irrele-
vant.
The fourth and most important type of use of the word "invention" is
as a concrete noun, referring to a device or process, or set of devices or proc-
esses, which is defined in terms of physical characteristics. It is in this sense
that "invention" is being used when one asserts that a certain "invention"
is new and useful. It is this type of use of the word "invention" which is dis-
cussed in the following sections of part II of this paper.
Colloquial uses of "invention" vis-d-vis "claims"
In some colloquial uses, the term "the invention" is often used to refer to
the "specific embodiment" which has been constructed by the inventor or
which has been described in his specification. An example of such uses is the
following:
.... A rejection is never to be taken literally. Remember that the Examiner is
not rejecting your invention. He may be quite prepared to admit that your in-
vention is patentable over the references. He is merely rejecting your claim: i.e.,
the way in which you have expressed your invention.61
In another colloquial use, it is used to refer to the specific embodiment
which (1) the applicant or patentee has sold commercially and (2) has any
-35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1952).
" See infra notes 123 and 176.
" See text at notes 120-123, and note 123, infra.
InHOAR, supra note 4, C.8 ("Fighting it Out") at § 8-38. (Emphasis added.).
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tenuous relation whatsoever to what is disclosed in the patent application.
The relationship may be as strong as a similarity of structure or as tenuous
as an identity of product name, inventor or manufacturer.
Still another colloquial use is the use of the term "the invention" to refer
to some vague undefined abstraction from the total set of specific embodi-
ments described above (i.e., the set of the specific embodiments built, de-
scribed in the application, or sold). In this use, synonyms of the term "the
invention" are the "essence" of what the patentee has invented, the "fruit
and essence," the "fundamental conception," the "substance," the "gist," the
"core," the "real invention," the "real nature," the "real novelty," the "prin-
cipal feature," the "capital idea," the "material part," the "soul of the de-
vice," the "heart," the "substance and heart," and the "pith and marrow."
62
The value of these terms "is exclusively in any esthetic thrill that it gives
us."65 These words result from the ignoring of the language of the claims and
the determining of the issue of infringement by "dream interpretation."6 4 The
tribunal depends
... upon its libido. It could go into a trance, if it wished, and during or after
emerging from the trance it could enunciate such words .... 6
The interrelation between colloquial uses of the term "invention" and
"claims" is illustrated by the following example:
.... Suppose that a neolithic man, whom we may call Homer Sapiens, has just
invented the first three-legged stool. Homer has found this stool .. . useful to sit
upon while milking his cows .... So Homer explains his invention to an at-
torney, who undertakes to prepare a patent application ..... the attorney may
propose to claim the invention as: "A seat to be occupied by a man when milk-
ing cows, comprising a circular piece of wood in combination with three wooden
legs of equal length for supporting the circular piece a fixed distance above the
ground."
Although this proposed claim defines the invention accurately, upon second
reading it appears to contain a number of unnecessary words. ... After all the
invention is essentially "a seat."
After going through ... cogitations and mental gyrations, the patent attorney
might decide upon these claims for his neolithic client's three-legged stool:
"What is claimed is:
1. A stool comprising a seat having a plurality of legs adapted to support the
seat.
2. A stool comprising a substantially flat seat in combination with a plurality
of legs of substantially equal length.
61 Some of these terms are collected in GLAscocK & STRINGHAM, PATENT LAW § 5950 (1943).
OId. at § 5951.
64Id. at § 5940.
6Ibid.
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3. A stool comprising a substantially flat circular seat in combination with
three legs of substantially equal length adapted to support the seat a fixed
distance from the ground. 6
The underlined uses of the term "invention" in this neolithic man example
are colloquial uses. The first two uses appear to refer to the specific embodi-
ment which has been constructed by the inventor; the second two uses ap-
pear to refer to some vague undefined abstraction from the specific embodi-
ment constructed by the inventor.
"Invention" as a term of art
The invention which would be protected by a valid patent which included
the three claims in the above example is a set of three "claimed inventions,"
-that of Claim 1, that of Claim 2, and that of Claim 3. All three claims are
broader than the specific embodiment which is described in the first para-
graph of the example. 7 Claim 1, for example, would exclude others from
making, using or selling, inter alia, chairs with 2,3,4,5 or 6 legs, wooden or
aluminum, with or without arms, with or without backs, with a level seat or
with a seat built with a Danish-modern curve, for use in milking cows or for
use by the fireside as an easy chair or for use playing the piano.
While at one place the 1952 Patent Act may use the term "the invention"
to mean some vague undefined abstraction from disclosed specific embodi-
ments,6 8 all of- (1) the "patented invention" protected against infringement
by §271 (a),69 (2) "the invention" referred to in the grant contained in a pat-
ent, 70 and (3) "the subject matter sought to be patented"7 1 which must meet
the "standard of invention" of §103-are the set of that which is described in
("recited by") a claim of the patent. Each claim of a patent recites a sepa-
BUCKLES, IDEAS, INVENTIONS AND PATENTS 85-86 (1957). Cf. id. at 193-95 (Emphasis added).
This is a standard example for illustrating the nature of patent claims.
w See text at note 57, supra. Claims 1 and 2 require less features than Claim 3 requires and
the specific embodiment constructed by the inventor possesses--e.g.: only two legs rather
than three legs. The claims also vary in the specificity of their description-e.g.: Claim I
requires "a seat," Claim 2 "a substantially flat seat," Claim 3 "a substantially flat circular
seat." [The specific embodiment is described as "a circular piece of wood.] It is of course
arbitrary whether a limitation in a claim is considered to add a feature to a claim (e.g., con-
sidering a claim limited to "at least 4 legs rather than "at least 3 legs" as having had a leg
"added" to the recited structure) or to qualify a feature of a claim (e.g., considering a claim
limited to "at least 4 legs" rather than "at least 3 legs" as having had its supporting structure
"qualified.').
6See 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (1952), set forth in note 54, supra. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 271 (c)
(1952), which uses the distinct, though vague and undefined, term: "material part of the
invention."
9... whoever... any patented invention .... infringes the patent." 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a)
(1952).
70 "Every patent shall contain ... a grant... of the rights to exclude others from making,
using and selling the invention .... 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1952).
"'"A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between the subject matter sought
to be patented and the prior art are such that .... " 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952).
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rate "patented invention" which may be infringed, and each must separately
meet the "standard of invention."
In its most important uses as a term of art, therefore, the term "invention"
refers either to the embodiments described in one of the claims or to the set
of embodiments described in the set of claims.
Clarity, confusion, and the "invention"
The term "the invention" has in the past been used to refer to all of: (1) the
first specific embodiment conceived of by the inventor, (2) any one of the
specific devices disclosed in the application for a patent, (3) the set of the
specific embodiments disclosed in the application, (4) the specific embodi-
ment which the patentee has sold commercially and has any tenuous relation
to what is disclosed in the patent application (e.g., the relation of similar
structure or identity of product name or identity of inventor), (5) some
vague undefined abstraction from the total set of specific embodiments de-
scribed above (also called the "essence," the "heart," etc.), (6) the embodi-
ments described in one of the claims, and (7) the set of embodiments de-
scribed in the set of claims. The indiscriminate use of the term "the inven-
tion" to convey any of seven different meanings, without specifying which
meaning, produces only misunderstanding.
Clarity would be best obtained by not using the term "the invention" at
all. Instead, the following terms are suggested: For the meanings given in (1)
to (4) above, use respectively: (1) "conceived-of-embodiment," (2) "dis-
closed embodiment," (3) "set of disclosed embodiments," and (4) "com-
mercial embodiment." For the meaning given in (5) above, until the entire
notion of protecting vague undefined abstractions is abandoned, using "ab-
stracted embodiment" would point out the need, for each purpose, to define
the abstraction used. For the sixth meaning given above, the embodiments
described in a claim, the term "claimed invention" seems clearest. Corre-
spondingly, for the seventh meaning given above, the set of embodiments de-
scribed in the set of claims, the "set of claimed inventions" should be used.
If the term "the invention" must be used at all, its use would best be restrict-
ed to mean the "set of claimed inventions," since it is the set of claimed in-
ventions which, individually, must meet the "standard of invention" and
must mark the basis for protection against infringement.
As a term of art, therefore, the term "the invention" should not be used
to refer to the specific embodiments described in the specification (often what
the inventor has when he walks into his attorney's office), but should refer
to the specific embodiments recited by the claims (often what the inventor
first has when he walks out of the attorney's office).7 2 When courts, bothered
7 Cf. Comments of Mr. Washburn in DYNAMICS at 121-22. "[I]t was known that the division
that this case would go into would resist strongly giving method claims if you only had
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by the fact that a very broad claim covers devices very different from the spe-
cific embodiments described in the specification, hold a claim invalid as
"broader than the invention" (rather than as "too broad"),73 they are using
the term "the invention" in a colloquial sense (regardless of whether they
are reaching the correct result). Courts sometimes reach the same result in
similar circumstances by: (1) holding the claim invalid as an attempt to pat-
ent an "idea," or (2) holding the claim invalid as an attempt to patent a
"principle of nature," or (3) holding the claim invalid as an attempt to pat-
ent all means for solving a given problem, or (4) by using the specific em-
bodiments described in the specification to interpret the words of the claim
so as to find it "valid but not infringed," or (5) by holding that the claim, as
so broadly interpreted, is invalid over liberally construed prior art. Courts
are likely to do this when presented with such claims as the following:
In a device of the class described, a female member split at its outer end, and
a headed male member insertible therein and adapted when seated to expand
said split portion, said female member being recesses internally beyond the ter-
mination of its split portion to receive the inner end of the head of the male
member.74
Thus, courts may do this in situations more restricted than those in which
what is claimed is all means for solving a given problem. However, for an
example of this latter type of claim, one which uses particularly inappropri-
ate language is the eighth claim of a patent to Samuel Morse ("Improve-
ment in Electro-Magnetic Telegraphs"), 75 which reads:
8. I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery, or parts of ma-
chinery, described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of my
invention being the use of the motive-power of the electric or galvanic current,
which I call electro-magnetism, however developed, for marking or printing in-
telligible characters, signs or letters, at any distances, being a new application
of that power, of which I am the first inventor or discoverer.
mental act performed, so the attorney worked long and hard to devise an apparatus which
would perform the method." (Emphasis added.) Queries: Is the patent invalid if the attorney
is not listed as a joint inventor? Is it a breach of professional ethics for the attorney to claim
to be a joint inventor? In an attempted investigation of this matter by the government or
by a defendant in an infringement suit, can the attorney and the client claim privilege on
the basis of attorney-client communication, or, in the attorney's case, on the basis of attorney
work-product?
"As to the subject of "too broad" claims generally, see both STRINGHAM, PATENT CLAIMS
§§ 5060-5069 (1939) and STRINGHAM, PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING §§ 5030-5032 (2d ed. 1952).
For background see STRINGHAM, PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING §§ 5050-5078 (1st ed. 1930).
74U.S. Patent No. 1,150,114 (Aug. 17, 1915), Claim 1. The specification discloses specific
embodiments which are threaded locking screws, "particularly adapted for use in securing
the lenses of an eyeglass in place upon the nose guard, but with slight modification adapted
for use in practically any structure in which locking screws are desired." Patent No. 1,150,114,
p. 1, col. 1, 11.15-20.
11 U.S. Reissue Patent No. 117 (1848).
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This claim was held "too broad, and not warranted by law" in O'Reilly v.
Morse (Claims 1-7 were held valid and infringed.).76
Confusion is also often apparent when critics of a court decision holding
the broad claims of a patent invalid, whether dissenting judges or commen-
tators, maintain that because the patentee's "invention" has revolutionized
the industry or been a tremendous commercial success, patent claims should
not be held invalid on the grounds of obviousness. Such critics are often con-
fusing (i) "the invention" in the colloquial sense of the embodiment which
the patentee has sold commercially with (ii) the very different (and perhaps
very obvious) "claimed invention" described by a broad claim. An example
of this type of confusion is exhibited in the discussion of Marconi Wireless
Telegraph Co. v. United States77 by Buckles.78 It is said there that the case
"hinged upon the question of whether Marconi's creation of wireless teleg-
raphy was the result of inventive skill or of 'ordinary skill in the art.' " (Em-
phasis added.) And indeed this is the position taken in the short dissenting
opinions of Justice Frankfurter 79 and Justice Rutledge, which focus on the
facts that Marconi had long been acknowledged as the first one to make wire-
less telegraphy commercial, and that in doing so he solved a problem which
had eluded the best minds of his day.s0 However, examination of the majority
opinion s ' reveals that:
1. The Supreme Court was not considering the original Marconi patent,
but only a later patent on an improvement. (The original patent was held
"not infringed" by the Court of Claims, but review of that holding was not
sought.)
82
2. The application (covering the improvement) presented to the Patent
Office contained some claims which did, and some which did not, recite a var-
iable inductance antenna tuner; the Examiner had taken the position that
he would not allow the latter claims unless they were amended so as to also
recite a variable inductance antenna tuner; the Examiner apparently did
not have before him the prior patent to Lodge for a variable inductance an-
tenna tuner.8  The Court, having the Lodge patent before it, affirmed the
Court of Claims decision holding the patent on the improvement invalid.
70 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853). As late as 1924 it was argued that this holding was incorrect
and the claim should have been held valid-see KEIFER, PIONEER INVENTIONS AND PIONEER
PATENTS 15-27 (2d ed. 1924); compare STRINGHAM, PATENT CLAIM DRAFrING § 5051 (1st ed.
1930). For other examples (the anesthetic use of ether; Bell's telephone patent) in which this
issue was litigated, see STRINCHAM, OUTLINE OF PATENT LAw § 1107 (1937).
320 U.S. 1, 57 USPQ 471 (1943).
7 BUCKLES, supra note 66, at 36-38.
7 With whom Justice Roberts concurred.
80 320 U.S. at 62, 64, 57 USPQ at 497, 498 (1945).
11 Per Chief Justice Stone, with whom Justices Douglas, Black, Reed and Jackson con-
curred.
8 320 U.S. at 4, 5, 57 USPQ at 473, 474 (1943).
'Id. at 31 & n.18, 57 USPQ at 484 & n. 18.
[Vol. XV
Clarifying Patent Terminology and Patent Concepts
3. The Court pointed out that the commercial success of Marconi's wire-
less telegraphy was due to features other than the one to which the claims of
this patent were directed.
8 4
The protection given to the "set of claimed inventions" in a "valid patent"
THE "RIGHTS" WHICH FLOW FROM OWNING A VALID PATENT: The "patent
right" is usually said to be the right to exclude others from making, using or
selling the "patented invention" [i.e.: the set of claimed inventions]. "[W] ho-
ever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention.., in-
fringes the patent."8 5 It is important to note that owning a valid patent does
not give the patentee himself any "right" or "privilege" to make, use or sell
the "patented invention."8 6 When this point is missed, confusion usually re-
sults. 8 7 The patent laws do not give the patentee the exclusive right to pro-
duce the "patented invention," but only the right to exclude others from
producing it. Either the government or some other patent owner may have
the "right" to prevent the patentee or his licensees from producing his own
"patented invention," It is therefore incorrect to say that: "the patent holder
is in a position of monopoly,"8 8 or: "the general purpose of the patent law
[is] to allow the patentee to get as much revenue from the patent as he can,"8 9
or:
... it appears to be the intent of the patent law that the patentee be offered a
monopolist's sanctuary with respect to his patent. ... If the patentee discovers
... that full exploitation of his patent suggests that he use tying arrangements
... it would seem that the spirit of the [patent] law favors the legality of the tie-
in.90
It is incorrect because one has a monopoly in the economic sense when one
can exclusively make and sell a product (or authorize use of a process)
for which there are no close substitutes available. The patent laws do not give
the patentee the right to exclusively make and sell because they do not give
him the right to do any making and selling; further, the patent laws do not
give the patentee the right to exclude others from making and selling close
substitutes--even perfect substitutes-which have different physical construc-
8 4
Id. at 35 & n.20, 57 USPQ at 486 & n.20.
T U.S.C. § 271 (a) (1952).
' See text at note 5 supra.
8 An example is the confusion in Note, 70 YALE L. J. 649 (1961), which results from this
point having been missed in the beginning (id. at 649, text at n.2). Justice Black (harmlessly)
missed this point in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (I), 365 U.S. 336,
350 & n.5, 128 USPQ 354, 361 & n.5 (1961) (concurring opinion).
88 NEALE, THE ANTrlRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 161 (1960).
81 KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 29, at 174.
90 Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 62 (1960).
1965]
24 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. XV
tions. Thus the patent laws do not give the patentee a monopoly in the eco-
nomic sense.
There are distinctions between the rights concerned with excluding others
from making and selling and those concerned with excluding others from
using 1
The "patent right," in the sense of the right to exclude others from mak-
ing, using or selling the "patented invention" [i.e.: the set of claimed inven-
tions], is expanded by doctrines which permit a patentee to enjoin a threat
of infringement and which treat as an infringer one who "actively in-
duces"9 2 infringement. It is also expanded by the doctrine of "contributory
infringement," which permits a patentee to exclude others from acts in re-
lation to something less than the whole thing claimed when there coexists
"direct" infringement.
93
The "patent right" was extended in 1964, by a closely divided Supreme
Court in the 2nd Aro Case, to include the right to exclude others from re-
pairing the "patented invention."
94
01 See Bloomer v. McQueen, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852) (per Justice Taney); Mitchell
v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 547 (1872) (per Justice Clifford); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Con-
vertible Top Replacement Co. (I), 365 U.S. 336, 359-60, 128 USPQ 354, 364-5 (1961) (con-
curring opinion of Justice Black), and (II), 377 U.S. 476, 496-97, 141 USPQ 681, 690 (1964).
"2"Actively induces" is the term used by 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b) [1952). Courts had previously
not used this term but had used the words "aid," "encourage" or "abet." Hoxie, "Misuse of
Patents," DYNAMICS 376. For a discussion of how the term "actively induces" can be expanded
or contracted depending upon one's emphasis on free trade in unpatented goods, see id. at
376-78.
See generally the 2nd Aro Case, cited inIra note 94.
9 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (II), 377 U.S. 476, 484-85, 141 USPQ
681, 685 (1964) (Justices Black, Douglas, Clark and Warren, C. J., dissenting). The extension
to include repairing is limited by restrictions set out in part IV of the opinion of the Court
(id. at 502-13, 141 USPQ at 692-96 [not joined in by Justice Harlan]), which undoubtedly
will be supported by the four dissenting Justices; there the measure of damages is limited to
damages arising from the prolongation of the original infringing use, thus excluding from
damages the profits lost from not doing the repair job or supplying replacement unpatented
components; there too the opinion states a specific refusal to express a view on whether the
repairing organization can be held liable for the royalty which should have been paid on
the original sale of the patented combination even if such royalty cannot be recovered from
the original manufacturer or his customers (the "users"). Also, Justice White joined with the
dissenting Justices to form a majority which held that the liability of contributory infringers
for this extension [and all other contributory infringement extensions] was dependent on a
showing of scienter, which for this extension was a showing that the repairing organization
had actual knowledge that the object being repaired infringed a patent. Id., text at 488 n.8;
141 USPQ, text at 687 n.8. The user, who now commits direct infringement by prolonging his
use by having repairs made, is still liable without such scienter (id. at 514, 141 USPQ at 703
[opinion of Justice White]), but in the case of "ultimate consumers" this is not of practical
significance. The drastic results which would come about if there should occur the wide-
spread suing of consumers (and repairmen if the Court had not adopted the scienter require-
ment) is graphically described by Justice Black (id. at 529-30, 141 USPQ at 702-03), speaking
for four Justices; but Justice Brennan, speaking for another four Justices, hints that such
suits may be impermissible (as well as impractical) when there is a solvent and accessible
manufacturer to sue (id. at 511-12, 141 USPQ at 696). On this latter issue see generally Ladd,
supra note 28.
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THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION AFFORDED BY THE "RIGHTS WHICH FLOW FROM
OWNING A VALID PATENT": The apparent Supreme Court doctrine is that
the scope of the "patented invention" protected against infringement is the
scope of protection against direct infringement given to the owner of a (par-
tially or totally) valid patent, and is measured solely by the valid claims.
That is to say, the "patented invention" protected against infringement is
the sets of specific embodiments which are recited by the claims being held
valid. This doctrine was recently reaffirmed in the 1st Aro Case.95
The scope of protection which is afforded was formerly expanded by a
doctrine of "virtual infringement" and a "doctrine of equivalents." The vir-
tual infringement doctrine had permitted a patentee to exclude others from
making, using or selling, etc. the "heart" 96 of any of the claimed inventions
recited by the claims being held valid. When the doctrine of equivalents was
considered relevant, and its operation was not suspended by the operation of
"file wrapper estoppel," 97 it expanded the sets of specific embodiments pro-
tected by the claims being held valid to include both the claimed inventions
and what the court considered its "equivalents." Sometimes courts so extend-
ed claims while at the same time failing to consider the validity of the claims
as extended, producing absurd results; for example, in Graver Tank & Mfg.
Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.,98 where the Supreme Court found narrow
claims valid and broad claims invalid, on a rehearing limited to the issue of
infringement of the narrow claims it found infringement by using the doc-
trine of equivalents to expand the narrow claims to the scope of the broad
claims previously found invalid. The extent to which these claim-extension
doctrines are used in the various federal circuits is surveyed in an article by
Malone & Schmalz. 99 The virtual infringement doctrine was specifically re-
jected by the Supreme Court in the Ist Aro Case. 100 The doctrine of equiva-
11 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (I), 365 U.S. 336, 339-40, 128 USPQ
354, 356-7 (1961) [discussed infra, text at notes 166-174] ("the claims made in the patent are
the sole measure of the grant"), citing McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419 (1891) and the
Mercoid Cases [Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co. & Mercoid Corp. v. Minne-
apolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.], 320 U.S. 661 & 680, 60 USPQ 21 & 30 (1944).
1 See notes 61-64 and accompanying text, supra, for a discussion of the notion of a "heart
of an invention."
1See Keith v. Charles E. Hires Co., 116 F.2d 46, 47 USPQ 402 (2d Cir. 1940) (per Judge
Learned Hand); Lewis v. Avco Mfg. Corp., 228 F.2d 919, 108 USPQ 147 (7th Cir. 1956).
336 U.S. 271, 80 USPQ 451 (1949), on rehearing 339 U.S. 605, 85 USPQ 328 (1950). The
Court [336 U.S. at 276-77, 80 USPQ at 453] upheld the holding of the District Court [75 USPQ
231, 237 (1947)] that broad claims 24 and 26 were invalid because not limited to alkaline
earth materials; the Court then limited the rehearing to the issue of infringement [339 U.S.
at 607, 85 USPQ at 330] and proceeded to expand previously upheld claims which had been
limited to alkaline earth materials [339 U.S. at 610, 85 USPQ at 331].
Malone & Schmalz, Peripheral Definition Theory v. Central Definition Theory in Patent
Claim Interpretation: A Survey of the Federal Circuits, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 609 (1964).
100365 U.S. at 344-45, 128 USPQ at 358-59 ("[T]his Court has made it clear ... that there
is no legally recognizable or protected 'essential' element, 'gist' or 'heart' of the invention.
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lents is based on the virtual infringement doctrine, as has been pointed out
by Judge Learned Hand,101 since it is supposed to give a patentee patent rights
with respect to the specific embodiment of another where (1) the claim can-
not be "construed" to cover another's specific embodiment, (2) the speci-
ficity with which the features of the claim are recited make it narrower than
the "heart" of the claimed invention, and (3) the specific embodiment of
another is to be deemed an "equivalent" because it contains the same "heart."
Thus the decision in the 1st Aro Case makes the present vitality of the doc-
trine of equivalents very doubtful. The Supreme Court may soon decide the
issue.10
2
The scope of protection which will be afforded will receive additional de
facto extension for the reason that potential defendants will consider them-
selves foreclosed by an apparently valid patent because of the uncertainty as
to which might be construed to infringe (or what might be held an "equiva-
lent").103
The scope of the protection which is afforded a valid patent will receive
still additional de facto extension when the patent is part of a block of re-
lated patents, each of whose scope is uncertain (especially if the doctrine of
equivalents has any vitality). When an entire block of patents is sued on, it
is unlikely that a trial court would not find at least one of the patents in the
block infringed, even if all the patents were such that if any were sued on
alone a court could be expected to find it not infringed.
104
The de facto scope of protection is also extended by the high cost of pat-
ent litigation, which enables a patentee to derive "nuisance value" income
by licensing others to trade in items which a court would probably hold non-
infringing.105
" Keith v. Charles E. Hires Co., 116 F.2d 46, 48 col. 1, 47 USPQ 402, 404 col. 1 (2d Cir.
1940). Cf. id. at 49 col. 1 11.53-56, 47 USPQ at 405 col. 1 11.56-60.
"I The doctrine of equivalents was used to find infringement in Calmar, Inc. v. Cook
Chemical Co., 336 F.2d 110, 142 USPQ 412 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. granted 380 U.S. 949 (1965)
(Nos. 778 and 810). This was not one of the "questions presented." 33 U.S. LAw WEEKL 8236
(Jan. 12, 1965).
10 The desirability of minimizing such uncertainty is one basis of Justice Black's criticism,
in the 1st Aro Case [365 U.S. at 358-59, 128 USPQ at 364 (concurring opinion)], of the vague
standards for a type of direct infringement which were proposed in the separate opinions
of Justice Brennan and Justice Harlan.
101 This is a common fear among small businessmen. Patent, Trademark and Copyright
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Report, S. REP. No. 72, 85th Cong.
1st Sess., 13 at (e) (1957). A block of patents has a similar effect on decisions on validity.
Independent patent owners tend to sell their rights to the owners of blocks of patents rather
than compete--see KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 29, at 166-and the size of blocks of patents
tends to snowball. Mr. Justice White stated in U.S. v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 197-98,
137 USPQ 808, 818 (1963) (concurring opinion), that he considered to be an antitrust prob-
lem the purchase, per se, by a dominant manufacturer, of an important patent which would
dominate new developments. Query: Is the sale of a patent, or the giving of an exclusive
license, the sale of an "asset" within the meaning of Section 7 of the Clayton Act?
105 Cf. note 6 and accompanying text, supra.
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III.
THE Two MEANINGS OF THE TERM "STANDARD OF INVENTION"
The Historical Background
The American concept of a patent has its roots in pre-1776 England and
Colonial America. 06 From colonial times through the early nineteenth cen-
tury, the legislatures of the several states issued to specific individuals pat-
ents on their "inventions" [colloquial use].107 State patents fell into disuse
during the early nineteenth century, and recent attempts to revive them have
been held unconstitutional. 08
Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 8 of the United States Constitution (the
"Patent Clause") provides:
The Congress shall have the power ... To promote the progress of ... useful
arts, by securing for limited times to ... inventors the exclusive right to their
respective ... discoveries.
Ever since 1790, Congress has provided that any "person" who has "in-
vented or discovered" a manufacture, a machine, or something which was a
member of other specifically designated classes of invention, or an improve-
ment thereon, which was "new and useful," could obtain a patent if certain
other conditions could be met.'0 9
1" These roots are extensively discussed in INLOW, THE PATENT GRANT 15-43 (1950) and
BUGBEE, THE EARLY AMERICAN LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE HISTORICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND COPYRIGHT SYSTEMS 47-204 (1961).
11 An exhaustive description of this is given by BUGBEE, supra note 106, at 140-249.
'The disuse of state patents during the early nineteenth century resulted from the
advantages of national patents. Id. at 245. Bugbee stated (in 1961) that: "There is a general
belief that states could legally grant patents today, provided that they do not conflict with
Federal Laws or grants." Id. at 245 n.67. The legality of state patents in light of the Patent
Clause of the Constitution had been argued by counsel in the famous case of Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, arguments for at 44-60, 84, 141-57, arguments against at 32-33,
165-77 (1824), which involved the constitutionality of a New York patent on Robert Fulton's
steamboat; but Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, specifically declined to decide
the issue (id. at 221), holding the state patent grant unconstitutional on the basis of the
Commerce Clause (id. at 186-221). The view which Bugbee asserted to be "general belief,"
which was the view of losing counsel in Gibbons v. Ogden, was unanimously rejected by the
Supreme Court in Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 140 USPQ 524 (1964); the
Court in the Stiffel Case held that grants of state patents, under any label, (including judicial
decisions based on notions of "unfair competition') were constitutionally incompatible with
the federal patent system projected by the Patent Clause. (The assertion that the Stiffel
Case is inconsistent with Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, which is made in an
article by Tom Arnold at 54 TRADEMARK REPORTER 413 (1964), is based on a misreading of
the reported case; all of the thirteen supposed quotes from C. J. Marshall's opinion (54
TRADEMARK REPORTER at 424-25) are quotes from the arguments of counsel, which run
from pages 1 to 186 of 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)-none of these quotes are actually from Marshall's
opinion at 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 186-222.)
"I The former Patent Acts are set out, in relevant part, in EDWARDS, EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH
A STATUTORY STANDARD OF INVENTION [Study No. 7 of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trade-
marks & Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (85th Cong. 1st Sess.)]
1-2 (1958).
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In the patent statutes, the only type of "person" considered capable of be-
ing an inventor is a natural person, not a corporation. (One who was held
as a slave was apparently considered a "person," but could not obtain a pat-
ent as an oath could not be taken that he was a "citizen" of a country.)" 0 But
under certain circumstances a corporation may file a patent application for
an unwilling inventor,"' or cause it to be issued to itself.112
Section 1 of the Patent Act of 1793,113 which was in effect until 1836,114 sub-
stituted the term "invented" for the term "invented or discovered." All Pat-
ent Acts before and since have used the term "invented or discovered," 115
thus considering "inventor-inventing-invention" and "discoverer-discovering-
discovery" synonymous terms within the constitutional reference to "inven-
tors... [and] their... discoveries." It is doubtful whether any legal signif-
icance would attach to a distinction between "inventing" and "discover-
ing."116
The corresponding provision in the present patent statute, the 1952 Pat-
ent Act provides:









110 Boyle, Patents and Civil Rights in 1857-8, 42 JOURNAL OF THE PATENT OFFICE SOCIETY
789 (1960).
135 U.S.C. § 118 (1952).
11235 U.S.C. § 152 (1952).
I's1 Stat. 318, partially set forth in EDWARDS, supra note 109, at 1.
M Ibid.
n51d. at 1-2 and 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (1952).
Il Compare, e.g., FRESENDEN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS 188-89
maxim 5 (1810) ("Patents for improvements and additions to old arts, discoveries, machines
and inventions may be obtained .. ") and LEE, WHAT CONSTITUTES PATENTABLE SUBJECT
MATTER 6-9 (1894) (of no practical importance) with Wyman, Merwin on Invention and 35
U.S.C. 103, 42 JOURNAL OF THE PATENT OFFICE SOCIETY 814 (1960) (different "standards of
invention" are required).
117 "When used in this title unless the context otherwise indicates--The term 'invention'
means invention or discovery." 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (1952).
us Exceptions are carved out, however, by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and expansions
are made by Chapter 15 (Plants) and Chapter 16 (Designs) of the 1952 Patent Act. These
"classes of invention" are subject to special regulation and are not included in the discussion
of "patents" in this paper.
"1 "When used in this title unless the context otherwise indicates--the term 'process' means
process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter or material." 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1952). Section 100(b) has several
difficulties of its own.
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may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and require-
ments of this title.
Prior to the Patent Act of 1952, the other specific statutory conditions to
be met did not include a specified "standard of invention."
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the accepted legal doctrine was
that a device was an "invention," by definition, if it was "new and useful."
Justice Story, on circuit in 1825, rejected in Earle v. Sawyer 20 a suggested re-
quirement of unobviousness to "persons skilled in the art who wished to pro-
duce the same result" as not within the terms or intendment of the Patent
Act.
In 1850, the issue of what constituted "invention" reached the Supreme
Court. In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood121 the Court propounded the "black-letter
legal doctrine"1 22 that every "invention" in addition to being "new and use-
ful" must be so differentiated from what was "old" that it could not be cre-
ated from the old with the ingenuity and skill possessed by an ordinary me-
chanic acquainted with the business. Hence one who has created a new and
useful device, has not invented a new and useful device, unless the device
qualifies as an "invention": if it fails to so qualify, the device is considered
"the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor."'23 Thirty
years later, in Pearce v. Mulford, 24 the Supreme Court reformulated the ver-
bal phrasing of its black letter legal doctrine so as to require from an improve-
ment "something more than what is obvious to one skilled in the art to which
it relates."
While as late as the turn of the century some still supported and favored
the legal doctrine which had been announced by Justice Story, 25 the "test"
of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (and Pearce v. Mulford) had become the accept-
2O 8 Fed. Cas. 254, No. 4247, at 256 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825).
In52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850).
122A "black-letter legal doctrine" being a verbal "formula" or "proposition," usually but
not necessarily in "if-then" form, which, because of the assumption that its terms have con-
tent which can be determined by a "finder of fact," is supposed to be of help to "decision-
makers" in deciding concrete cases.
121 (Emphasis added.) 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 267. All of the Patent Acts, including the present
one, have used the word "invented." Notes 113-115 and accompanying text, supra. The Con-
stitution uses the words "inventors" and "discoveries [inventions]." The Court in Hotchkiss
v. Greenwood did not specify whether it was interpreting the Patent Act or the Constitution
when it defined "inventor-invented-invention." In Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U.S. 1, 11 11.
7-8, 20-24 (1884), the Court specifically declares that it is interpreting both. See note 176
infra.
102 U.S. 112, 118 (1880).
"'E.g.: LEE, supra note 116, at 31-35 (1894).
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ed black-letter legal doctrine during the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. It has remained the accepted doctrine during the twentieth century.126
The two meanings of "standard of invention"
The term "standard of invention" has two meanings. One meaning is: the
term "standard of invention" is the name of the verbal formula which con-
stitutes the black-letter legal doctrine propounded in Hotchkiss v. Green-
wood. This is the meaning of the term "standard of invention" in such state-
ments as: "The standard of invention is: the improvement must be unob-
vious to one skilled in the art to which it relates." and "The standard of in-
vention requires something more than mere mechanical skill."
It has long been recognized, however, that the "standard of invention"
(meaning the verbal formula which constitutes the legal doctrine) is of al-
most no help whatsoever to a "decision-maker" (judge, patent examiner,
patentee, potential defendant, etc.) faced with the task of determining wheth-
er a claimed device is an "invention."'1 27 As early as 1891, the Supreme Court
stated: 128
"... The truth is the word [invention] cannot be defined in such manner as to
afford any substantial aid in determining whether a particular device ... [meets
the standard of invention.] In a given case, we may be able to say that there is
present invention of a very high order. In another we can see that there is lack-
ing that impalpable something which distinguishes invention from simple me-
chanical skill. Courts, adopting fixed princples as a guide, have by a process of
exclusion determined that certain variations in old devices do or do not involve
In 1941 an attempt was made to return to Justice Story's doctrine.
In the Cuno Case counsel argued that the "skill of the art" test laid down in Hotchkiss
v. Greenwood was wrong and that "degree of invention or ingenuity is not a test contem-
plated by the Constitution and the patent laws to determine whether or not an invention
or discovery shall receive protection***."
FROST, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND THE MODERN ECONOMY [Study No. 2 of The Subcommittee
on Patents, Trademarks & Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (84th
Cong. 2d Sess.)] 59 n.239 (1957), citing Brief for Petitioner, pp. 42-43, Cuno Corp. v. Auto-
matic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. at 84 [51 USPQ 272] (1941).
In a sweeping opinion famous for the extreme language used, this argument was rejected
... because:
"*** the new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative
genius, not merely the skill of the calling. If it fails, it has not established its right to a
private grant on the public domain."
Id. at 50, citing 314 U.S. at 91 [51 USPQ at 275].
.. The sweeping statements of the opinion appear to be more in the nature of an em-
phatic answer to this contention than an effort to establish a new standard. Indeed, the
last sentence of the opinion states that the considerations set forth in the opinion "prevent
any relaxation of the rule of the Hotchkiss case," (314 U.S. at 92) [51 USPQ at 276].
Id. at 59 n.239.
11 "Invention" is here used in the sense of a semi-abtract noun which refers to a class of
devices and processes which possess a common inventive quality. See Four types of uses of
the term "invention," supra.
McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891).
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invention; but whether the variation relied upon in a particular case is any-
thing more than ordinary mechanical skill is a question which cannot be an-
swered by applying [as] the test . . . any general definition."
This has been perhaps best articulated in an oft-quoted passage by Judge
Frank: 1
29
" 'Invention' for patent purposes has been difficult to define. Efforts to cage the
concept in words have proved almost as unsuccessful as attempts verbally to im-
prison the concept 'beautiful.' Indeed, when one reads most discussions of 'in-
vention,' one recalls Kipling's 'It's pretty, but is it Art?' and the aphorism that
there is no sense in disputes about matters of taste. Anatole France once said
that literary criticism is the adventure of the critic's soul among masterpieces.
To the casual observer, judicial patent decisions are the adventures of the
judges' souls among inventions. For a decision as to whether or not a thing is an
invention is a 'value' judgment. So are many other judicial judgments in other
legal provinces, but 'invention' is a peculiarly elusive standard."
So, when the term "standard of invention" is used in a manner such as:
"Invention" being incapable of absolute definition, and its presence or ab-
sence being largely sensed rather than determined, the standard of invention
is necessarily a variable one.18 0
it has a meaning different from the one already described (that of the name
of the verbal formula which constitutes the legal doctrine). This second mean-
ing is: the amount of difference between the "claimed invention" and the
"prior art" which a "decision-maker" will require be present in order to con-
sider the legal doctrine satisfied, i.e., the degree of unobviousness that a "de-
cision-maker" will require be present, i.e., the amount of that impalpable
something which a "decision-maker" will require be present. This is the mean-
ing of the term "standard of invention" in the statement:
[J]udicial onslaughts have greatly increased the standard of skill expected in an
art .... [they have] resulted in considerably increasing the standard of invention
which the courts apply today. It is generally the opinion of the patent bar that
this trend toward raising the standard of invention, which has been in progress
for at least twenty years, has now expended its force and that at the present time
a plateau has been reached which will presumably not be exceeded in the fore-
seeable future. 131
and the statement:
(Emphasis added.) Picard v. United Aircraft Corporation, 128 F.2d 632, 639 53 USPQ
563 (2d Cir. 1942) (concurring opinion).
13
0 
BUCKLES, supra note 66 at 48. Compare HAYES, THE NATURE OF PATENTABLE INVENTION
(1945), whose 176 pages consist almost entirely of quotations of paragraphs of court decisions
whose words purportedly set out verbal formulas defining "invention."
M BUCKLES, supra note 66, at 49.
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The Patent Office has been criticized for delay and for its low standard of
[invention] in relation to the standards enforced by the courts.132
The "standard of invention" (in this latter sense), as pointed out by Judge
Frank, rests on a "value judgment"; it rests on the decision-maker's value
judgment as to the political and economic nature and significance of the pat-
ent system.'5 5 At any point in time, these value judgments will be different
among different classes of "decision-makers" (e.g., the Supreme Court, the
patent bar, the staff of patent Examiners, potential defendants, etc.), and
will vary among the "decision-makers" in any class (e.g., will vary among
Supreme Court Justices, will vary among patent Examiners, etc.). Thus some
"decision-makers" will demand "a little more," and others "a little less," be-
fore considering the "standard of invention" [meaning the verbal formula
constituting the legal doctrine] to be met (i.e., will have different "standards
of invention"). 34 Further, the value judgments of many "decision-makers"
as to the nature of the patent grant have changed through time over the past
hundred years; during the second half of the nineteenth century, political
and economic cross-currents caused a patent to be thought of by Congress and
the Supreme Court as a private property right (almost a natural right' 3s) of
I KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 29, at 163.
In While there is a huge amount of literature on the subject of the political and economic
nature and significance of the patent system, only a small proportion of it actually attempts
to analyze the subject. Much of it consists of nothing more than statements of conclusions,
their authors apparently believing, in the words of Thurman Arnold, that:
(T)hey perform a real function in bolstering up the morale of the side on which they are
used. The trick is to find a pair of polar words, in which the nice word fits your own
position and the bad word is applied to the other fellow.
ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 169 (1937). Much of the pre-1958 literature (446 items)
is cited in ALLEN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF PATENTS AND THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM: A BIBLI-
OGRAPHY, [Study No. 14 of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (85th Cong., 2d Sess.)] (1958). Other literature is
cited in KURSCH, INSIDE THE PATENT OFFICE 154-159 (1959), STRINCHAM, OUTLINE OF PATENT
LAW 514-16, 554-597 (1937), and TOULMIN, INVENTION AND THE LAw 317-340 (1936). Among
the more recent literature is Blaustein, Basic Economics and Patent Law, 42 JOURNAL OF THE
PATENT OFFICE SOCIETY 337 (1960), and SCHERER ET AL., PATENTS AND THE CORPORATION (2d
ed. 1959). An annotated bibliography of publications concerning the patent system appears
in each issue of THE PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND EDUCA-
TION, retitled IDEA as of Vol. 8 (1964), which also publishes research articles on the patent
system.
"I Cf. Zabel, The Search for Rules Helpful in Determining Invention, 30 JOURNAL OF THE
PATENT OFFICE SOCIETY 854, 866 (1948), who argues that a criteria of invention should be
defined in terms of economic considerations because of the fact that the "so called standard
of invention can almost be said to vary between zero and infinity."
I... In holding [while on circuit, in Jones v. Sewall, 13 Fed. Cas. 1017, No. 7495 (C.C.D.
Maine, 1873), reversed on other grounds 91 U.S. 171 (1895)] that the inventor has an abso-
lute right to secure his invention by letters patent regardless of the will of the sovereign,
Justice Clifford was in reality giving final confirmation to a position that had long been
contended for by the manufacturing interests. It was the idea that the patent grant receives
its right from the general laws of property and not from the arbitrary will of the king or
the legislature.
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an inventor,13 6 however during the twentieth century, that view was replaced
(at least in the Supreme Court)137 by the view of a "patent" as "a private
grant on the public domain."' 38 Thus it is not surprising that as the twen-
tieth century view displaced the nineteenth century view, the Supreme Court
has come to demand "a little more" before it would consider the "standard
of invention" (meaning the verbal formula constituting the legal doctrine)
to be met (i.e., the Supreme Court has been raising its "standard of inven-
tion"). The circuit courts of appeals,
... as early as 1932, and repeatedly since then, have recognized that the low con-
dition of inventive level during the chief-justiceship of Justice Taft is no longer
tolerable .... 139
and have followed the example of Judge Learned Hand, who had in 1942
written:
... we cannot ... ignore the fact that the Supreme Court, whose word is final,
has for a decade or more shown an increasing disposition to raise the standard
of originality necessary for a patent. In this we recognize "a pronounced new
doctrinal trend" which it is our duty, cautiously to be sure, to follow, not to re-
sist.1 4 0
In 1943, the National Patent Planning Commission appointed by Presi-
dent Roosevelt' 41 reported that "One of the greatest technical weaknesses of
INLOW, supra note 106, at 100-01. Long before this in Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591,
658-61 (1834), the Supreme Court had given its original pre-Clifford disavowal to the natural
law view, which had been urged on it by counsel ten years earlier in Gibbons v. Ogden, cited
supra note 108, at 50-51, 146-48 (contra arguments at 174-75). The natural law view was unan-
imously rejected by a twentieth century Supreme Court, which declared that: "Patent rights
exist only by virtue of statute. Wheaton v. Peters ..... Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
376 U.S. 225, 229 n.5, 140 USPQ 524, 527 n.5 (1964).
"I An excellent description of how these economic and political cross-currents affected
Congress and the Supreme Court, and the role of Mr. Justice Clifford in formulating nine-
teenth century Supreme Court patent doctrine, is given by INLOW, supra note 106, at 84-106.
As to the development of the concept (of patent rights as private property rights) itself,
during the first half of the nineteenth century, see id. at 59-83.
181 Compare S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, Patents and Antitrusts: Peaceful Coexistence, 54
MIcH. L. REV. 199, 203-4 (1955) ("In recent years there has been a questioning of the concept
of the patent as a property right.... You will not find any unequivocal judicial countenance
of these heresies."). In support, Prof. Oppenheim refers to 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1952) ("patents
shall have the attributes of personal property"); however, it is irrelevant to Section 261, which
merely makes the granted patent rights "personal property" for the purposes of "ownership"
and "assignment," whether the granted rights are grants "on the public domain" or "private
property rights."
I Mr. Justice Douglas in Cuno Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91, 51
USPQ 272, 275 (1941).
'm GLASCOCK & STRINGRAM, PATENT LAw § 3188. The Supreme Court's raising of its "stand-
ard of invention" thus dates from before President Franklin D. Roosevelt began making
appointments to the Court. Judge Jerome Frank, as cited supra note 2.
'o Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 636, 53 USPQ 563, 567 (1942). See also
the quote from BUCKLES, text at note 131, supra.
"n Executive Order 8977 (Dec. 16, 1941), 6 FED. REG. 6441 (1941), reprinted 24 JOURNAL OF
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the patent system is the lack of a definitive yardstick as to what is invention.
To provide such a yardstick... [i]t is proposed that Congress shall declare
a national standard whereby patentability of an invention shall be deter-
mined."'1 42 It apparently felt that if the verbal formula which constitued the
legal doctrine was declared by Congress, rather than the Supreme Court,
this would somehow "assure that the various court of law and the Patent
Office shall use the same standards,"'143 i.e., would require the same amount
of unobviousness,
The Current Status of the "Standard of Invention"
In 1952 Congress passed a new Patent Act in which it set out in statute for
the first time a verbal formula for the "standard of invention." Section 103
provides, in part144:
THE PATENT OFFICE SOCIETY 15 (1942). Its members were Charles Kettering (Chairman),
Chester Davis, Francis Gaines, Edward McGrady and Owen Young. Short profiles of the
members are given id. at 17-18.
12 (Emphasis added.) National Patent Planning Commission, The American Patent System,
H. R. Doc. No. 239, 78th Cong. 1st Sess., 10 (1943); reprinted as 57 USPQ No. 12-Special
Edition, 10 (1943); reprinted at 25 JOURNAL OF THE PATENT OFFICE SOCIETY 455 (1943), at 462.
" Ibid.
" Section 103 concludes: "Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which
the invention was made." This sentence was inserted to settle fears, probably unfounded,
that the opinion in the Cuno Case [cited and discussed supra note 126] had substituted (or
added) a subjective test of "invention" (how the applicant proceeded from his knowledge of
the prior art to the claimed invention) for the objective "standard of invention" (an amount
of difference between the claimed invention and the (objective) prior art which would have
been unobvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art). A subjective test would be
focused on the quality of the act of inventing, i.e., the way the result (the set of claimed
inventions?) was arrived at. The objective "standard of invention" is focused on the quality
of the result itself, as measured by what it contributes to the existing stock of knowledge.
Eighty years ago the official view was that the Patent Act and the Constitution required
both a subjective test and the objective one. In Pearce v. Mulford, 102 U.S. 112, 118 (1880),
where the Supreme Court reformulated the verbal phrasing of the "standard of invention"
to require that the "invention" be "something more than what is obvious to one skilled in
the art to which it relates," the Court in the very same sentence first required that "it be the
product of some exercise of the inventive faculties ..... In so doing it tied to the statute's
word "invented" both a "standard of (what constituted an) invention" and a test for what
constituted an "inventor" (i.e.: a subjective test of "invention"). In Thompson v. Boisselier,
114 U.S. 1, 11 (1884), the Court declared that both requirements were constitutional ones,
saying that the Patent Clause requires that "the beneficiary must be an inventor and lie
must have made a discovery [invention]." The subjective test of "invention" seems to
have been abandoned years before the Cuno Case. To the extent that the last sentence
of § 103 rules out such a test, its only basis would have to be a constitutional one. The
Supreme Court has not recently ruled on whether the first half of the constitutional doctrine
of Thompson v. Boisselier still has any vitality. [As to the vitality of the second half, see
note 176 infra.]
Note that to the extent that industry is unaware of the technological knowledge stored in
libraries and in Patent Office files, "commercial success" is a subjective test of "invention"
rather than an objective one.
Where an "inventor" has met the subjective test but perhaps not the objective one, some
classes of "decision-makers" may be moved by counsel's stressing of his mental act-see
Comments of Mr. Cooch, DYNAMICs at 72 ("... the courts have the idea that invention is
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§ 103. Conditions for patentability; non-obvious
subject matter
A patent may not be obtained
though
the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth
in section 102 of this title,
if
the differences between
the subject matter sought
to be patented
and the prior art
are such that
the subject matter as a whole
would have been
obvious




in the art to which the
subject matter pertains.
A history of the legislative efforts culminating in §103 is given by Edwards.145
Section 103 makes a comparison between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the "prior art."
... Unlike another fictional character of the law, the Reasonable Prudent Man,
this character whom I call Mr. Prior Art is not the product of intuition and
changing modes of judgment. He is a paper and paste man, carefully put to-
gether by industrious lawyers making vigilant searches into dusty archives of the
Patent Office, the libraries and workshops.14
6
However:
... The patentee, naturally, attempts to strictly limit the contents of each piece
of paper pasted on Mr. Prior Art by showing that it has no relationship or only
a limited relationship to the other pieces of paper. 147
Section 103 specifically refers back to §102, which is directed to the many
and diverse legal issues which relate to the "new"-ness of a claimed inven-
not ... the mental process .... Now to speak of ... invention .. .[as] his mental process
... may or may not be correct when we are talking to the Patent Office, but it is not correct
in the courts.")
145 EDWARDS, supra note 109, at 9-15.
10 Rifkind, Romance Discoverable in Patent Cases, 37 JOURNAL OF THE PATENT OFFICE
SOCIETY 319, 324 (1955).
14 Blaustein, supra note 133, at 346.
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tion; a reference whose date and form satisfy a criteria of §102, and which
without combination with other references teaches the claimed invention, is
considered to be "anticipatory art," and negates "new"-ness. 148 The legisla-
tive history of §103 indicates that the phrase "the prior art" in §103 is not
limited to those references whose dates and forms satisfy a §102 criteria for
anticipatory art.
140
It has been questioned whether the phrase "the prior art" in §103 includes
all references whose dates and forms satisfy a §102 criteria for anticipatory
art. 5 0 Such a questioning is based on §103's declaration that obviousness is to
be determined "at the time the invention was made," and asserts that Con-
gress changed prior law so that references which date from after this time
cannot form part of the prior art. (Only some §102 criteria require that refer-
ences not date from after a patent applicant's act of inventing; other sec-
tions only require that references be more than 1 year older than the patent
applicant's filing date.) The usual view is that one constructs the prior art
(which may include obscure publications that a person with ordinary skill
in the art would never have seen), and then determines whether "the differ-
ences are such that" they could be readily supplied (so as to form "the sub-
"'For a general discussion of what constitutes anticipatory art, see Woodcock, What is
Prior Art?, and the floor discussion following, in DYNAMICS at 263-332.
"'In H.R. 3760 (82d Cong. 1st Sess.) (1951) (the bill on which the 1951 Hearings were
held), § 103 read:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or de-
scribed in the prior art set forth in section 102 of this title ....
(Emphasis added.) The proposed substitute of the Bar Association of the City of New York
read:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or de-
scribed as set forth in section 102 of this title ..... (hearings, pp. 221-222).
(Emphasis added.) EDWARDS, supra note 109, at 15.
The purpose of these proposed changes was to make it clear that all prior art is here
meant and not merely the prior art referred to in section 102 which is limited to anticipa-
tory art (hearings, pp. 221-222).
Ibid.
The committee, almost a year after the hearing, on May 20, 1952, in lieu of reporting
H.R. 3760, introduced a fresh bill, H.R. 7794, which was approved and signed by the
President, July 21, 1952.
Section 103 of the new bill, which became law without amendment, differed from
section H.R. 3760 in that it incorporated the amendments proposed by the Bar Association
of the City of New York, set forth above.
Ibid. However, in the House and Senate reports [H.R. REP. 1923, 82d Cong. 2d Sess., 7 (1052)
and S. REP. 1979, 82d Cong. 2d Sess., 6 (1952)] is found the statement:
... [Section 103] refers to ... the prior art, meaning what was known before as described
in section 102.
Id. at 16. And Mr. P. J. Frederico, in his "Commentary on the New Patent Act," 35 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1, 20 (1954), is ambiguous on this point when he says that:
... The antecedent of the words, "the prior art," which here appear in the statute for the
first time, lies in the phrase "disclosed or described as set forth in Section 102" and hence
these words refer to material specified in Section 102 as the basis for comparison.
"I Woodcock, supra note 148, at 307-12. This has always been a minority view-see id. at
319-21, 325-26 (floor discussion).
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ject matter as a whole") by a person with the general knowledge that one
"having ordinary skill in the art" would have had "at the time the invention
was made." How can the phrase "at the time the invention was made" be
any more than a reminder to the courts not to take contemporaneous gen-
eral knowledge for what was general knowledge when the patentee did his
inventing? For if "invention" is being used in this phrase as a term of art and
not colloquially, then it refers to the set of claimed inventions; in that case
the time at which they are made would be either when the attorney finishes
drafting them, the patent's filing date or the patent's issue date. In any event,
the legislative history is clear that the term "the prior art" includes, at least,
all references which satisfy a §102 anticipatory art criteria,151 and there was
no congressional intent to change prior decisional law on this point.152 When
the Court of Customs 8c Patent Appeals recently changed its long time posi-
tion and read some §102 anticipatory art out of §103's "prior art,"'153 the re-
action was sharp. It reversed itself a year later; 54 the U. S. District Courts,155
the U. S. Courts of Appeals' 156 and even the Patent Office Board of Appeals
5 7
emphatically responded by holding that the wording of §103 was not in-
tended by Congress to change the previous decisional law in which the crite-
ria for anticipatory art were also criteria for constructing the prior art used
in applying the "standard of invention." This issue is now before the Su-
preme Court.
5 8
Since §103 refers to "invention[s] ... not identically ... described as set
forth in §102," one might assume that §102 concerns only cases where there is
"'All of the legislative history set forth supra note 149 shows this clearly. Accord: Chief
Judge Worley in Switzer v. Sockman, 333 F.2d 935, 944, 142 USPQ 226, 233 (CCPA, 1964)
(concurring opinion). A breakdown of this problem by subsection of § 102 appears in Sobel,
Prior Art and Obviousness, 47 JOURNAL OF THE PATENT OFFICE SOCIETY 79 (1965).
'1 See also note 165 and accompanying text infra (1952 Patent Act only intended to codify
previous decisional law).
1mln re Palmquest, 319 F.2d 547, 138 USPQ 234 (CCPA, 1963) (Worley, C. J., not partici-
pating) (§ 102 (b) art [publication printed more than one year before filing date]), dissented
from Switzer v. Sockman, 333 F.2d 935, 944, 142 USPQ 226, 233 (CCPA, 1964) (concurring
opinion of Worley, C. J.).
In re Harry, 333 F.2d 920, 923, 142 USPQ 164, 167 (CCPA, 1964) (holding: § 102 (e) art
[copending application]; dictum: § 102 (a) & (b) art).
115Judge Jackson (retired judge, C.C.P.A.) in Hazeltine Research Inc. v. Ladd, 226 F. Supp
459, 140 USPQ 444 (D.D.C. 1964) (§ 102(e) art [copending application]), aff'd per curiam,
340 F.2d 786, 143 USPQ 337 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. granted 380 U.S. 960 (April 5, 1965) (No.
919); Dix-Seal Corp. v. New Haven Trap Rock Co., 236 F. Supp. 914, 920, 144 USPQ 57, 63
(D. Conn. 1964) (semble) (§ 102 (b) art [publication and prior use more than one year before
filing date].
a5 Hazeltine Research v. Ladd, cited note 155 supra; Johnson & Johnson v. Kendall Co.,
327 F.2d 391, 140 USPQ 289 (7th Cir. 1964) (semble), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964) (§ 102(b)
art [public use more than one year before filing date]).
15' Ex parte Wilson, 144 USPQ 131 (P.O. Bd. of App. 1965) (§ 102 (a), (b) and (e) art).
(This decision came after the Court of Customs & Patent Appeals had, at least in dictum,
reversed itself.)
m Hazeltine Research v. Ladd, cited note 155 supra.
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no difference between the claimed invention and a single reference, and that
§103 concerns all cases where there is a non-obvious difference between the
claimed invention and either a single reference or a combination of refer-
ences. However such an assumption would be incorrect because previous
decisional law required from anticipatory art only a degree of identity, not
absolute identity. The federal courts (but not the Court of Customs & Pat-
ent Appeals) have followed their previous decisions and have said that there
was no congressional intent to have this phrase of §103 read back into §102
so as to change previous anticipatory art criteria; they have held that a
claimed invention does not meet §102 (b)'s criteria of "new"-ness unless there
is an unobvious difference between it and the single reference. 59 The issue is
of course moot if it is accepted that the "prior art" of §103 includes all refer-
ences which satisfy the anticipatory art criteria of §102.
The "prior art" of §103 is an "objective" construction of references, and is
not limited to what the inventor actually knew to be old.160
Taken as a whole, §103 sets forth a verbal formula for a "standard of in-
vention." It is clear that in §103
... the test of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood was written into the statutes ... 161
as the "standard of invention" (meaning the verbal formula constituting the
legal doctrine), and it has generally been so held.102 What has been disputed
159 Bros. Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 317 F.2d 413, 416-17, 137 USPQ 624, 626-27 (8th Cir.
1963) (publications printed more than one year prior to filing date), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
825 (1963); Dix-Seal Corp. v. New Haven Trap Rock Co., 236 F.Supp. 914, 920-22, 144 USPQ
57, 63-64 (printed publication), id. at 916-20, 144 USPQ at 60-63 (public use more than one
year prior to filing date) (D. Conn. 1964), citing Bros. Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co. supra
(printed publication), many lower court cases (public use), old Supreme Court cases (public
use), and 1 WALKER, PATENTS § 87 (Deller's ed. 1937) (public use). 1 id. at § 50 supports this
view for publications printed more than one year prior to filing date. See also note 165 and
accompanying text infra (1952 Patent Act only intended to codify previous decisional law).
16oCompare Rule 7 of the Patent Office of the Confederate States of America (based on
the May 21, 1861 Act of the Confederate Congress):
Even although the applicant has in good faith made the invention, a patent therefor
will not be granted him, if the whole or any part of what he claims as new had before
been patented, or described in any printed publication in this or any foreign country; or
he has abandoned his invention, or if, with his consent and allowance, it has been for
more than two years in public use or on sale.
(Emphasis added.) CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, RuLES AND DIRECTIONS FOR PROCEEDING
IN THE CONFEDERATE STATES PATENT OFFICE 5 (1861). Cf. note 144 supra.
101 Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney [at that time Chairman of the Patent, Trademark &
Copyright Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate], "Foreword" to
EDWARDS, supra note 109, at III; U.S. PATENT OFFICE (GEORGE ROEMING), supra note 8, text
at 1 n.3.
. . . [It] is merely a paraphrase of language which had been used in innumerable court
decisions prior to the act, including Pearce v. Mulford.
Reynolds [at that time Chief Technical Advisor, CCPA; presently Assistant Commissioner,
U.S. Patent Office], The Standard of Invention in the Patent Office, DYNAMICS at 2.
1" See the quotations from 1952-1957 court decisions collected in EDWARDS, supra note 109,
at 17-22.
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is whether or not Congress "intended" to have the courts require "a little
less," to meet the "standard of invention" [the verbal formula], than it had
been requiring (i.e., whether or not Congress intended to lower the courts'
"standard of invention"). On this latter point judicial opinion is divided,163
and the literature is voluminous. 64 The difficulty in determining congres-
sional intent with respect to possible changes in previous decisional law is
compounded by the fact that the Congressional Record was altered so as not
to show that Congress, which unanimously passed the 1952 Patent Act, was
led to think that it was only codifying existing decisions. 165
1 The cases cited ibid. are grouped according to whether they infer that the amount of
unobviousness required to meet the "standard of invention" (1) is unchanged, or (2) has
been changed, or whether they express no definitive assertion pro or con. Id. at 23-24. In
Chin, The Statutory Standard of Invention, 3 THE PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT
JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND EDUCATION 317, 321-23 (1959), the score is given as six circuits (1st,
3rd, 5th, 7th, 8th & 9th) saying that Congress did not intend to change what was required to
meet the "standard of invention," and five circuits (2nd, 4th, 6th, 10th, & D.C.) saying that
Congress intended that a little less be required. However: the 10th Circuit case cited by Chin
is more properly classified (as done by EDWARDS, supra note 109, at 24) as a case where the
court expressed no difinitive assertion pro or con; the existence of the earlier cases in the
4th, 6th and D.C. Circuits cited by Chin, which say the opposite, does not show that these
circuits have "swung over to the minority," but merely shows that different panels in a circuit
can say different things, as well as do different things while saying the same thing; and since
in the second 2nd Circuit case cited by Chin the patent was held invalid, there is no reason
for assuming a priori that what the 2nd Circuit is doing is the same as what it is saying. More
relevant that what is being said by the courts-perhaps-is what they are doing, as measured
by the changes since 1952, within each circuit, in the proportion of adjudicated patents held
valid and infringed, invalid, or not infringed. Comparisons of the circuits for the years
1948-55, 1956-57, and 1948-57 are given by Dann in DYNAMICS at 57-58 (aggregate statistics
appear id at 55); year by year comparisons for 1949-58 appear in SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, AN ANALYSIS OF PATENT
LITIGATION STATISTICS, 24-25 (1961). The interpretation of such statistics, as well as the re-
lationship of what courts say and what courts do in patent cases, is beyond the scope of this
paper.
164 A "selected" bibliography of signed articles and unsigned notes and comments (through
1957) is given in EDWARDS, supra note 109, at 25-29. Additional articles are cited in Chin,
supra note 163, at 325 n.49, 328 n.64 (bibliographical footnote).
Im Key features of the legislative history of the Act while on the floor of the Senate are set
out in EDWARDS, supra note 109, at 15-17, and more clearly explained in Chin, supra note 163,
at 325. Senator Wiley, in presenting the bill for consideration, stated [98 CONG. REC. 9097
(1952)]:
The bill simply constitutes a restatement of the patent laws of the United States.
Later, when Senator McCarran took up the bill, the following exchange occurred [98 CONG.
REC. 9323 (1952)]:
Mr. Saltonstall. Mr. President, will the Senator from Nevada tell us the purpose of the
bill?
Mr. McCarran. The bill would codify the patent laws of the United States. It is under the
able guidance of the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. Wiley.
Mr. Saltonstall. I am not a patent lawyer, but I know patents are a very technical subject.
Does the bill change the law in any way or only codify the present patent laws?
Mr. McCarran. It codifies the present patent laws.
(Emphasis added.) EDWARDS does not make clear that the Senate passed the bill immediately
after this exchange-the statement qualifying Senator McCarran's answer which was later
added to the Congressional Record ("... there have been some changes in the law .. ") was
never read on the floor of the Senate. The Senate understood that it was not changing pre-
vious decisional law.
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The Supreme Court has not yet directly passed on the issue of whether
"Congress intended" §103 to lower the courts' "standard of invention" or
whether only a codification was intended. However, an analogous issue was
decided in the Ist Aro Case.' 66 This case concerned a patented combination
of (1) a fabric auto top and (2) a mechanism for putting up the top. The
question "of law" to be decided was whether replacing a worn out fabric
top constituted "repair" of the combination or "reconstruction" (a "mak-
ing") of the combination; if the latter, the supplier of new fabric tops (who
was sued) could be liable as a contributory infringer, since the individual
car owners he was supplying and servicing (who were not sued) would be
direct infringers. The majority opinion'6 7 held that "§271 (a) of the new pat-
ent code, which defines 'infringement', left intact the entire body of case law
on direct infringement," citing the Reviser's Note on §271 (a) ("declaratory
only") and P. J. Frederico's "Commentary on the Patent Act" [35 U.S.C.A.1,
51 (1954)].168 The majority opinion then reviewed previous Supreme Court
cases (including the Mercoid Cases' 6 9) and decided which definition of "re-
construction" the previous case law had established (choosing the narrowest
definition). The opinions of Justice Brennan 170 and Justice Harlan 171 agreed
that §271 (a) is only a codification, but relied on legislative history as deter-
mining what the case law which was codified was. Justice Black concurred
with the majority opinion, but wrote a separate opinion specifically answer-
ing the opinions of Justice Brennan and Justice Harlan. (e.g., Justice Harlan
points out that §271 was passed without objection, 172 to which Justice Black
replies by citing the exchange between Senators Saltonstall and McCarran
[set forth note 144 supra].178 ) Justice Black would read the 1952 Patent Act
in view of the "contemporaneously passed" Small Business Act of 1953 (15
U.S.C. §§631-651).
174
Separate from the question of whether Congress "intended" for §103 to
lower the courts' "standard of invention" is the question of whether it could
even if it wished to. There is substantial authority in the lower federal courts
that the "standard of invention" is a matter of constitutional interpretation
1 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (I), cert. granted [U.S. Dept. of
Justice (Antitrust Division) as amicus curiae], 362 U.S. 902 (1960), motion "of The American
Patent Law Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae" denied, 364 U.S. 806 (1960),
case decided 365 U.S. 336, 128 USPQ 354 (1961). The case came up again on the status of the
repair of unlicensed combinations-see note 94 supra.
107 Per Justice Whittaker, with Justices Douglas, Black, Clark and Warren, C. J.
" 365 U.S. at 341-42, 128 USPQ at 357.
161 Cited supra note 95.
"70 Concurring in the result but dissenting as to doctrine.
171 With whom Justices Frankfurter and Stewart joined, dissenting.
171365 U.S. at 378 n.7, 128 USPQ at 372 n.7.
171 Id. at 347 n.2, 128 USPQ at 360 n.2.
1
7
1 Id. at 359, 128 USPQ at 364.
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(interpretation of the terms "inventor," "discoveries[inventions]" and "pro-
mote ... progress," which appear in the Constitution's grant of power to
Congress), and if §103
... is an effort as has been suggested, to reduce the standard of invention as rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court, then that effort must fail for the reason that the
Supreme Court is the final authority on the constitutional standard of patent-
ability.
1 7 5
This view appears in both old and recent Supreme Court cases, and may al-
ready amount to a holding.
176
15 Seismograph Service Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, 135 F. Supp. 342, 350-51, 107 USPQ 104,
110 (E.D. La. 1953).
There have been no direct holdings of unconstitutionality since most courts have interpret-
ed the statute so as to avoid considering the constitutional problem, saying, e.g.:
... Nor is it likely that constitutional problems will arise so long as the expected interpre-
tations of the statute come within the boundaries of long standing judicial declarations of
the content of patentability.
R. M. Palmer Co. v. Luden's Inc., 236 F.2d 496, 499, 111 USPQ 1, 4 (3rd Cir. 1956).
Some courts, while allowing Congress some freedom of action in this area, set the test of
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood as a constitutional minimum below which the "standard of in-
vention" could not be set, and so interpret the statute, saying:
... Congress ... did not and could not ... abandon the distinction between mere me-
chanical skill and "inventive genius" for that concept is inherent in the constitutional
purpose....
Blish, Mize & Sillman Hdwe. Co. v. Time Saver Tools, 236 F.2d 913, 915, 111 USPQ 6, 8
(10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1004 (1957). Accord: John Deere Co. v. Graham, 333
F.2d 529, 535, 142 USPQ 243, 248 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 956 (1965) (No. 580).
176 Challenges to various sections of the 1952 Patent on the Grounds of unconstitution-
ality are not frivolous. The Constitution's Patent Clause [Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8] has recently been
applied so as to invalidate grants of state patents (by means of judicial decisions based on
notions of "unfair competition')-see note 108 supra. It had been interpreted eighty years
ago to require a subjective test of invention in addition to the objective "standard of in-
vention"-see note 144 supra. And in the recent 2nd Aro Case (cited and discussed note 94
supra) the constitutionality of § 271 (c) (which makes certain sellings of unpatented parts
contributory infringement) was barely upheld even after it was narrowly construed and
limited; Justice Black's dissenting opinion (for 4 Justices) viewed the giving of patent pro-
tection to unpatented products, under any label (including "contributory infringement'),
as unconstitutional, since they are not "discoveries [inventions]" as the Patent Clause requires
[377 U.S. at 522, 141 USPQ at 699-700]; Justice Brennan (for 5 Justices) said that the majority
had no doubts about the constitutionality of § 271 (c) "as so construed and applied, within
the limitations set forth in the succeeding portions of th[e] opinion" [ (Emphasis added.) id.
at 492 n.10, 141 USPQ at 688 n.10]; the "construction" included a requirement of scienter and
the "limitations" included a measure of damages which is limited to damages arising from
the prolongation of the original infringing use and cannot include profits lost from not
supplying replacement unpatented components-see note 94 supra.
When the Supreme Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood first set out the "standard of in-
vention" (see text at notes 121-23 supra), it did not specify whether it was interpreting the
statute or the Constitution. Nor did it specify in Pearce v. Mulford, 102 U.S. 112, 118 (1880),
where it reformulated the verbal formula so as to require that:
... it must be the product of some exercise of the inventive faculties, and it must involve
something more than what is obvious to one skilled in the art to which it relates.
However in Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U.S. 1, 11 11. 7-8, 20-24 (1884), the Court specifically
declares that it is interpreting both the statute and the Constitution, saying that the Patent
Clause requires that the:
1965]
Catholic University Law Review
Since the Supreme Court has recently decided to break its 15 year silence
on questions of patent validity, and has taken three cases concerning the
"standard of invention,"'177 it may soon pass on the issues of whether Congress
"intended" §103 to lower the "standard of invention" and whether it could
constitutionally do so.
ADDENDUM
In a strikingly unusual decision, the C.C.P.A. has just held in In re Foster, 343 F.2d
980, 145 USPQ 166 (CCPA, Aug. 3, 1965), that: (1) § 102 requires unobvious differ-
ences between claimed inventions and anticipatory art [343 F.2d at 988, 989, 145
USPQ at 173, 174] (see test at note 159 supra), (2) the test of unobviousness applies to
combinations of any references which satisfy the requirements for anticipatory art
[343 F.2d at 988, 145 USPQ at 173] (see text at note 151 supra), this having been the
intent of Congress [343 F.2d at 990, 145 USPQ at 175] (see text at note 152 supra), and
In re Palmquest is explicitly overruled [343 F.2d at 989, 145 USPQ at 174] (see text at
note 152 supra [§ 102(b) art]), and (3) the phrase "at the time the invention was
made" was included in §103 "for the sole purpose of precluding the use of hindsight
in deciding whether an invention is obvious" [343 F.2d at 990, 145 USPQ at 174] (see
text following note 150 supra).
APPENDIX
Detailed analysis of the legal issues concerning "new-ness" (novelty), "usefulness"
(utility), and "invention" appears in many texts.
An excellent text, reflecting the work of the American legal realists, is STRINGHAM,
OUTLINE OF PATENT LAW (Pacot Publ., Madison, Wisc., 1937). A work focusing on
the use of tactics is R. S. HOAR, PATENT TACTICS AND THE LAW (3rd ed.) (Ronald
Press, New York, 1950).
Extensive "black-letter" treatment of these issues can be found in the standard
treatises on patents, such as WALKER, PATENTS [Deller's ed. (4 Vol.) (Baker, Voorhis
& Co., New York, 1937), with 1964 SUPPLEMENT], AMDUR, PATENT LAW AND PRAC-
TICE (Clark Boardman, New York, 1935), and RIVISE AND CAESAR, PATENTABILITY
... beneficiary must be an inventor and he must have made a discovery [invention]....
Thus the concurring opinion of Justice Black in the Ist Aro Case [365 U.S. at 361-61, 128
USPQ at 365], the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas (with whom Justice Black joined)
in the A&P Case [340 U.S. at 154-58, 87 USPQ at 306-07], and the federal court cases cited
note 175 supra, which express the view that the "standard of invention" is a matter of con-
stitutional interpretation, are all built on a long standing foundation. In Sears, Roebuck Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 1.8, 140 USPQ 524, 528 1.51 (1964), Justice Black, speaking for
the Court without dissent on this point, speaks of orders of novelty which do not meet
federal constitutional standards.
in Graham v. John Deere Co., No. 580, U.S. Sup. Ct., granting cert., 379 U. S. 956 (1965),
reviewing 333 F.2d 529, 142 USPQ 243 (8th Cir. 1964); Calmar Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co.,
Nos. 778 & 810, U.S. Sup. Ct., granting cert., 380 U.S. 949 (1965), reviewing 336 F.2d 110, 142
USPQ 412 (8th Cir. 1964); and U. S. v. Adams, No. 906, U.S. Sup. Ct., granting cert., 380 U.S.
949 (1965), reviewing 330 F.2d 622, 141 USPQ 361 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
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AND VALIDITY (Michie Co., Charlottesville, 1936). More superficial "black-letter
treatments" of these issues can be found in H. A. TOULMIN, HANDBOOK OF PATENTS,
2nd ed. (Anderson, Cincinnati, 1954), and AMDUR, PATENT FUNDAMENTALS
(Chemical Publ. Co., New York, 1941). There is also, unfortunately, much litera-
ture directed to the "amateur inventor" which is so extremely superficial as to con-
stitute a dangerous trap for the innocent and the unwary; see, e.g., Lucy Brett An-
drew [who was "in charge of the Information Center in the Hall of Inventions at the
1939 World's Fair"], Practical Patent Procedure (4th ed.) [Pamphlet] (Bruhn Bros.,
Jamaica, N. Y., 1958).
For texts approaching these issues from the point of view of prosecuting applica-
tions before the Patent Office, see the standard "black-letter" work in its field (for
Patent Office personnel as well as patent attorneys), McCRADY, PATENT OFFICE
PRACTICE (4th ed.) (Margit Publ., Pasadena, 1959).
"The first edition of 387 pages was published in 1928 and was based on lectures
given by Lloyd H. Sutton, at George Washington University, who also lectured on
substantive patent law. The second edition in 1946 had 466 pages. The third edi-
tion in 1950 had 604 pages and acknowledges the collaboration of Emerson String-
ham who declined to be designated as joint author. The first systematic work on
Patent Office practice was published by Emerson Stringham in 1924 entitled, Exam-
ining Patent Applications, and three sets of Supplemental Sheets were issued by 1929.
This work was based on 10 lectures given by Emerson Stringham in 1924 for patent
examiners who at that time were required to pass examinations relating to practice
in the Patent Office to qualify for promotions. In 1930 Emerson Stringham issued a
revised edition entitled, Patent Soliciting and Examining. A new edition was pub-
lished in 1934 and a supplement in 1940. The only prior guide to Patent Office Prac-
tice was E. S. Glascock, Manual of Patent Office Practice, published by the Patent
Office Society in 1920. It consisted of 67 pages, mostly texts of Commissioner Orders
and Notices. This manual went through nine editions by 1947 as revised by C. L.
Wolcott and contained 367 pages.
"During 1917 and 1918 when the Patent Office Society was founded by patent ex-
aminers, lectures were given by patent examiners on patent law and practice. These
lectures were published in pamphlet form. Since 1918 the Patent Office Society has
published each month the Journal of the Patent Office Society, now in its 42nd vol-
ume, which constitutes a unique source of important articles relating to Patent Office
practice. In 1949 the Patent Office for the first time published a loose-leaf Manual
of Patent Office Examining Procedure and a second edition in 1953 which is kept
up to date by supplemental sheets. This Manual contains detailed instructions to
Examiners covering various questions which may arise during prosecution in the
Patent Office. Another pioneer work was published by Charles W. Rivise, The Prep-
aration and Prosecution of Patent Applications. It is still very useful."
Rossman, Book Review, 43 JOURNAL OF THE PATENT OFFICE SOCIETY 165, 166 n.1
(1961).
Texts more superficial than McCrady's are AMDUR, PATENT OFFICE RULES AND
PRACTICE (Seidman and Horwitz rev. ed.) (Mathew Bender, Albany, & Clark Board-
man, New York, 1962) and FISHBURNE, THE PATENT APPLICATION (2nd ed.) (Byrne &
1965]
44 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. XV
Co., Washington, 1947) [illustrations are given (from patented files) of unappealed
Examiners' decisions].
For a recent discussion of these issues, which begins where most of the texts leave
off, see DYNAMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM: DISCUSSIONS OF TEN CRITICAL AREAS OF
CONTEMPORARY PATENT LAW (transcript of delivered papers and floor discussions
from ten patent law seminars held at the Villanova University School of Law, 1957)
(Ball ed., Central Book Co., New York, 1960) [cited as DYNAMICS throughout the
text].
